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Abstract. 
The 2002 Farm Bill has placed a great emphasis on programs cost-sharing the 
adoption of conservation practices on working land. Empirical evaluation of these 
programs, however, has received little attention. Reasons explaining this gap in the 
literature may be the voluntary nature of participation and the multi-objective quality 
of these programs, which complicate econometric analyses. An adequate assessment 
of cost-sharing programs requires the modeling of multivariate responses that 
frequently involve limited-dependent variables and other types of unobserved 
information. In this study I formulate an algorithm that solves such a problem and 
then I use this tool to evaluate two cost-sharing programs. 
I begin this Dissertation by formulating a Monte-Carlo Expectation-
Maximization (MCEM) algorithm that solves a variety of models involving 
unobserved information in systems of linear-in-parameter equations.  
 Subsequently, I use the MCEM algorithm to solve a multiple adoption model 
and evaluate the extent at which cost-sharing payments have influenced cropping 
operations in Maryland. I find that soil conservation practices expand cropping both 
at the extensive and the intensive margin. I also prove that farmers implement 
practices that provide on-farm benefits preferentially. Finally, I show that cost sharing 
has a perverse effect: since farmers prefer to implement practices that provide private 
benefits, the expansion in cropping induced by cost-sharing those practices reduces 
the extent at which practices that provide public goods are used.  
In a second empirical analysis, I analyze policy implications of ignoring 
nutrient dynamics in the targeting strategy of programs cost-sharing soil fertility 
recovery. The analysis focuses on the phosphorus fixation problem in soils derived 
from volcanic ash. Using an optimal control framework, I conclude that, conditional 
on individual characteristics, the optimal fertilization path leads either to follow a 
low-yield fertilization strategy or to maintain a high-yield phosphorus level in the 
soil. Empirical estimations on Chilean data show that program impact differs among 
the two regimes and that program efficiency can be improved by targeting 
preferentially those farms financially or technologically constrained on the low-yield 
fertilization path instead of allocating the funds conditional on whether or not 
phosphorus stock is below or above an exogenously determined target level. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation deals with the evaluation of agri-environmental programs and with 
some econometric methodology to carry out that evaluation. Agri-environmental 
programs (also called green programs) aim to reduce nonpoint source pollution 
generated by farming activities, protect wildlife habitat, improve water quality, and 
sustain farm productivity. Some program goals may also include curbing production 
of surplus commodity and providing income support for farmers. Agri-environmental 
programs can be broadly classified in two groups: land retirement programs, and 
working-land conservation programs. Well-known examples include the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program (EQIP), respectively. Land retirement programs work by taking land out 
from production. As compensation they offer long-term contracts consisting in annual 
rental payments and cost-share assistance to farmers to establish permanent 
vegetative covers (e.g. grass, trees) on land enrolled. Programs targeting working land 
attempt to improve environment management on land under production. They cost-
share adoption of structural practices that require high initial investment, or provide 
incentive payments for the adoption of managerial conservation practices whose 
profitability may be perceived as uncertain by the farmer. These so-called best 
management practices (BMPs) vary widely in nature and they range from planting 
riparian buffers and cover crops to the construction of manure and waste storage 
structures and the use of integrated pest management. 
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Much has been written about the design and performance of land-retirement 
conservation programs, particularly after the first signup of the Conservation Reserve 
Program in the last eighties (Reichelderfer and Bogges, 1998; Ribaudo, 1989; 
Babcock et al., 1997; Feather et al., 1999; Wu, 2000; Vukina, 2004). Same effort, 
however, has not been undertaken for working-land conservation programs. Almost 
all of the existing studies about these programs focus their attention on farmer’s 
minimum willingness to accept in order to induce participation (Lohr and Park, 1995; 
Cooper and Keim, 1996; Cooper, 1997). More specifically, they use contingent 
valuation techniques to estimate the minimum payment (and its determinants) 
necessary to induce a farmer to adopt a given technology or a bundle of them. 
Although these studies are useful for program design, they do not shed light about 
how well programs have been doing so far, and consequently, they do not provide 
much information about how to improve program effectiveness.  
 
In the present study I attempt to address this gap in the literature. I do this by 
proceeding in two steps. First, I begin by developing an algorithm to estimate systems 
of structural equations with latent variables. The need for such an econometric tool is 
due to the fact that the farmer conservation decisions are integral to the production 
system of the farm and, consequently, can hardly be considered independent of 
production decisions. Thus, the analysis of farmer choices about whether to apply to a 
conservation program, what practices to implement and how much land these 
practices should cover conditional on receiving funding, how much land to crop 
conditional on the new technology implemented, and how much land must be 
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allocated to grassland and permanent vegetative cover must be considered in a joint 
framework. 
 
Additionally, data available for these types of studies is frequently rich in 
dichotomous endogenous variables (e.g. only dichotomous indicators of participation 
or technology adoption may be observed), which make necessary the introduction of 
latent variables in the model. The researcher may also decide to use latent variables in 
order to add flexibility to the model or to represent some underlying unobserved 
process. As commercial software capable of solving general forms of these types of 
models is not currently available, I have found it necessary to begin this study by 
formulating a suitable algorithm by my own. 
 
Then I use the algorithm introduced above and two data sets, one from Maryland and 
other from Chile, to analyze different issues related to agri-environmental programs.  
 
The remaining of this dissertation is organized in three chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
implement a flexible and robust algorithm for estimating systems of linear-in-
parameters equations involving unobserved information by maximum likelihood. The 
procedure uses a Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization (MCEM) algorithm that 
exploits the underlying latent continuum to obtain efficient estimators for a wide 
variety of models involving systems of structural equations with latent variables. I 
begin the chapter by discussing the issues that make the estimation of these models by 
traditional methods too cumbersome or even unfeasible. Then I formulate an 
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algorithm for systems of equations where the latent variables enter only as dependent 
variables, i.e. on the left-hand side of the equations. The performance of the MCEM 
algorithm is compared against a numerical integration approach by solving a 3-
equation system where the observed counterparts of the dependent variables are either 
dichotomous or limited-dependent. Finally, I generalize the algorithm to estimate 
systems of structural equations, i.e. models in which the latent variables appear not 
only on the left-hand side of the equations but also as endogenous regressors. 
 
In Chapter 3 I use data from Maryland farmers to study the interaction between 
conservation and production decisions and how this interdependence may generate 
unintended effects of the program. I show that, by subsidizing the adoption of land-
quality augmenting technology, agri-environmental programs may induce changes in 
land profitability and affect cropping patterns of participant farms. I find that 
adoption of soil conservation practices expands cropping operations at both the 
intensive and the extensive margins. Additionally, programs that cost-share the 
adoption of these practices may have the perverse effect of reducing the share of land 
under practices that provide public goods. These findings raise questions as to the 
appropriateness of treating conservation cost-sharing payments as “green-box” under 
WTO’s regulations. 
 
In Chapter 4 I use data from Chile to analyze the targeting policy of a cost sharing 
program aiming to replenish soil phosphorus fertility. I begin the analysis by solving 
an optimal-control problem to determine the farmer’s optimal soil fertilization 
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strategy. I show that two optimal paths exist. Depending on farmer characteristics and 
initial level of phosphorus in the soil, the farmer may choose either to follow a 
subsistence fertilization strategy (low yield path) or remediate soil fertility until a 
higher level of phosphorus is achieved (high yield path). In order to evaluate the 
impact of the program on each of the two possible regimes, I formulate an 
endogenous-switching regression framework with unobserved switching points. A 
switching equation determines the probability of being in each regime conditional on 
farm characteristics; then specific fertilization-path equations are used to determine 
the effect of cost sharing on each regime. Estimation results indicate that program 
effects are greater on financially and/or technologically constrained farms being on 
the low yield path, while cost sharing might have only short run effects or be 
equivalent to a pure transfer on farms in the high yield path.
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Chapter 2: A Monte Carlo EM Algorithm to Estimate Structural Equation 
Systems with Unobserved Information 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Models involving equation systems with latent structures are abundant in applied 
economics. Examples include sample selectivity models, switching regression 
models, multivariate and nested tobit models, multivariate and multinomial probit 
models, and panel data models with random effects. The use of latent variables gives 
some level of independence from the limitations of the observed data to the applied 
econometrician. For instance, completely or partially unobserved variables can be 
added to the empirical model in order to get a better representation of the 
phenomenon under study. However, the use of latent variables does not come without 
costs. An important issue is that both the number and the dimensionality of the 
integral terms in the likelihood function increase with the number of latent variables 
considered. High dimensional integration slows the estimation down and it can even 
make the estimation unfeasible in presence of integrals of dimension greater than 
three. A second issue arises from the inability of many conventional optimization 
algorithms to identify the parameters of these models even though conditions for 
formal identification are satisfied. “Fragile” identification, as it called by Keane 
(1992), tends to happen when the objective function shows little variation in a wide 
range of parameter values around the maximum, which prevents convergence of 
gradient-based algorithms. Finally, the selection of starting values in order to initiate 
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the optimization routine is a frequent problem in maximum likelihood estimation of 
models with latent structures. Consequently, the development of algorithms with low 
sensitivity to the selection of starting values (i.e. with a larger approximation area) is 
always welcome. 
 
The traditional approaches for estimating 2-equation systems that involve latent 
variables have been maximum likelihood and 2-step estimation methods (Heckman, 
1979; Maddala, 1983). The first one is more desirable because it produces consistent 
and efficient estimates; however, it is prone to “fragile” identification and starting 
value problems. The second one is robust, but it is not efficient. For equation systems 
involving three or more latent variables, maximum likelihood estimation by 
numerical integration is often too costly computationally or even unfeasible since 
quadrature methods for high dimensional integrals are still in development. This so-
called “curse of dimensionality” has, however, been partially overcome in the last 
years by the use of probability simulators (Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993; 
Geweke et al., 1994) and Monte Carlo and Quasi-Monte Carlo integration methods 
(Sobol, 1998). Still, the focus of these approaches is only on making the integration 
of the likelihood function feasible, which implies that the problems of “fragile” 
identification and starting values remain.  
 
Instead of placing the attention on calculating the integrals in the likelihood function, 
the approach presented in this study focuses on the latent continuum generating the 
observed information. By combining a Monte Carlo Expectation-Maximization 
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(MCEM) algorithm with a sequential conditional maximization procedure, I show 
that the estimation of any system of linear (in parameters) equations with latent 
variables can be seen as equivalent to estimating a system of linear (in parameters) 
equations with fully observed information recursively. The use of a MCEM 
circumvents the integration problem by imputing the unobserved information using 
Gibbs sampling (Casella and George, 1992). Since the use of the Gibbs sampler in the 
Expectation step permits “restoring” the continuum, the Maximization step does not 
differ much from maximizing the likelihood function of a standard linear equation 
system. Complementarily, the use of sequential maximization steps permits 
concentration of the optimization effort on those parameters that are frequently the 
hardest to identify, i.e. the elements of the disturbance covariance matrix. Finally, the 
MCEM framework confines the estimates to the parameter space at every iteration of 
the algorithm and reduces dependency on starting values. This study generalizes the 
procedure developed by Natarajan et al. (2000) for multinomial probit models. Its 
main contribution is the implementation of a robust algorithm that exploits explicitly 
the structural similarity between models that have been traditionally estimated by 
rather ad-hoc methods. 
 
The remaining of this chapter is organized in the following way. The next section 
discusses the meaning of unobserved information in the context of this study. The 
third section presents the MCEM algorithm and exemplifies how it works by 
estimating a 3-equation problem. The fourth section solves the same problem as in the 
previous section by numerical integration. The outputs of both approaches are 
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compared. The fifth section generalizes the algorithm to cover system of structural 
equations with latent variables. The sixth and last section gives final remarks. 
 
2 Unobserved information  
For purposes of this study I consider two ways that unobserved information might 
enter in econometric estimations: by the existence of missing data, and by the 
presence of latent variables. Missing data are observations that the researcher failed to 
collect for all the individuals in the sample. Missing information can originate by 
multiple ways such as inability to sample the same unit along different years when 
constructing a panel data set, or unwillingness of the respondent to answer specific 
questions in a survey.  
 
By latent variable I mean a continuous variable that is not observed fully; 
nonetheless, part of the information contained in the variable is available to the 
econometrician. This observed counterpart originates a new variable, whose type (e.g. 
dichotomous, polytomous, limited-dependent) will depend on how it relates to the 
underlying latent variable.  
 
It must be kept in mind that those variables containing missing data, although less 
structured, can also be seen and understood as another kind of latent variable. As a 
consequence, the methods that I am about to present in order to estimate models 
involving latent variables can be used to deal with missing information as well.  
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3 The Monte Carlo Expectation- Maximization (MCEM) algorithm 
In their presentation before the Royal Statistical Society, Dempster et al. (1977) 
introduced the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm as an iterative procedure to 
compute maximum likelihood estimates “... when the observations can be viewed as 
incomplete data.” 
 
The way the notion of “incomplete data” is introduced above is indeed very general 
and it is this flexibility in the idea of incomplete data what is responsible of a good 
deal of EM algorithm’s broad applicability. To give a flavor of how the algorithm 
works consider the following many-to-one mapping  
( )z Z y y z Y∈ → = ∈  
The information z  in Z  is not observed directly but through its observed realization 
y  in Y . In words, z  is only known to lie in ( )Z y , the subset of Z  determined by 
the equation ( )y y z= , where y  is the observed (measurable) data. 
 
Let the complete data be written as ( ),=x y z , where z  is the unobserved 
information. Then the log-likelihood function of the observed information can be 
written as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )| ln | ln |  Z yL L dθ θ θ= = ∫A y y x z   (2.1) 
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As previously discussed, the integrals present in (2.1) can make the maximization of 
( )|θA y  cumbersome or even impossible to solve by standard optimization methods. 
Instead of trying to solve (2.1) directly, the EM algorithm focuses on the complete-
information log-likelihood ( )|c θA x  and maximizes ( )|cE θ  A x  by executing 
iteratively two steps. The first one is the so-called Expectation step or E-step, which 
at iteration m+1 computes ( ) ( )( )| , |m cQ Eθ θ θ =  Ay x , where ( )|cE θ  A x  is the 
expectation of the complete-information log-likelihood conditional on the observed 
information and provided that the conditional density ( )( )| , mf θx y  is known. The E-
step is followed by the Maximization step or M-step, which maximizes ( )( )| ,mQ θ θ y  
to find ( 1)mθ + . Then the procedure is repeated until convergence is attained. Often, 
however, this deterministic version of the EM algorithm has also to deal with hefty 
integrals in the calculation of the expectations in the E-step.  
 
The stochastic version of the EM algorithm presented here avoids troublesome 
computations in the E-step by imputing the unobserved information conditional on 
what is observed and on distribution assumptions. In this approach the term 
( )( )| ,mQ θ θ y  is approximated by the mean ( )
1
1 , |
K
(k)
k
Q
K
θ
=
∑ z y , where the (k)z  are 
random samples from ( )( )| ,mf θx y  (Wei and Tanner, 1990). No integrals need to be 
estimated in this procedure. Once the unobserved information is imputed, the latent 
continuum is made “visible” and the estimation can be carried out as we were solving 
a standard system of linear equations. 
 12
 
3.1 Implementing the Monte Carlo EM algorithm. 
I illustrate the use of the MCEM algorithm by solving the following 3-equation 
system 
 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 1 2 2 2
*
3 3 1 3 3 3
i i i
i i i i
i i i i
y x
y y x
y y x
β ε
γ β ε
γ β ε
= +
= + +
= + +
  (2.2) 
 
where 1iy  is dichotomous, and 2iy  and 3iy  are censored from below at zero, i.e. 
*
1
1 *
1
1 if 0
0  if 0 
i
i
i
y
y
y
 >=  ≤
 
* *
2 2
2 *
2
if 0
0  if 0 
i i
i
i
y y
y
y
 >=  ≤
 
* *
3 3
3 *
3
if 0
0  if 0 
i i
i
i
y y
y
y
 >=  ≤
 
 
Equation system (2.2) contains only the observed counterparts of the latent variables 
on the right-hand side of the equations. It is clear that more general cases should 
consider both latent and observed endogenous regressors. The discussion of those 
cases will be delayed until Section 5. In the meantime the use of simpler models like 
(2.2) is more suitable to introduce the Monte Carlo EM algorithm. This will allow us 
to concentrate on methodological aspects and not get distracted by complications in 
the model structure.  
 
The disturbance terms in (2.2) are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution 
( )0,N Σ  with covariance matrix 
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1 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 3 3
1 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3
1 3 2 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 3
2 2
2 2
1 1ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
σ σ ρ σ ρ σ
σ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ
σ σ σ ρ σ ρ σ σ σ
      Σ = =            
 (2.3) 
 
where 
1
2 1εσ =  is the usual normalization to ensure identification of the coefficients in 
an equation with a dichotomous dependent variable and 
k lε ερ  is the correlation 
coefficient between kε  and ( ) , 1, 2,3l k lε = .  
 
There are two forms of the structural model for the system in (2.2) depending on the 
value of the observed counterpart of *1iy , i.e. 
 
1 1iy =  1 0iy =   
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
*
3 3 3 3 3
i i i
i i i
i i i
y x
y x
y x
β ε
γ β ε
γ β ε
= +
= + +
= + +
 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2
*
3 3 3 3
i i i
i i i
i i i
y x
y x
y x
β ε
β ε
β ε
= +
= +
= +
 
 
(2.4)
 
According to (2.4) the parameters 2γ  and 3γ  only represent shifts in the intercepts of 
the second and third equations when 1 1iy = . Thus, under the normality assumption, 
the complete data likelihood function can be written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
' 1
1 2 3 1 23 2
1, | , , exp
22
i i
i i i
i i
L f y y y π
−  ΣΣ = = −  Σ   
∏ ∏x ε εθ  
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Where ( )1 2 2 3 3, , ,β γ β γ , β=θ , 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 1 2 2
*
3 3 3 1 3 3
i i i
i i i i i
i i i i
y X
y y X
y y X
ε β
ε γ β
ε γ β
 −    = = − −     − −   
ε  
 
Correspondingly, the complete information log-likelihood function and its 
expectation are  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 '3 1, | ln 2 ln tr
2 2 2
c
i i
i
N Nπ −Σ = − − Σ − Σ∑A xθ ε ε  
( ) ( ) 1 '3 1, | ln 2 ln tr
2 2 2
c
i i
i
N NE Eπ −    Σ = − − Σ − Σ     ∑A xθ ε ε  (2.5) 
 
Where N  is the total number of observations and the expectation operator indicates 
expectation conditional on observed information and distributional assumptions. The 
E-step is straightforward from equation (2.5) and, at iteration 1m + , requires the 
calculation of  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
*
1
2
'* *
1 1 1 1 1 1
' * *
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
* *
3 3 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3
1 1
2
| , , | , , | , ,
                     
i
i
i i i i
m m m m m m
i i i i i j i i j
i i j i i j
m
iy
m
i y
y X y X
Q E E y y X y y X
y y X y y X
X
β β
γ β γ β
γ β γ β
µ β
µσ
   − −    Σ = Σ = − − − − Σ        − − − −    
−
= +
y y yθ θ ε ε θ θ
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
*
1
* *
2
* *
3 3
'
1 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3
i
i
i i
m
iy
m m
i i i iy
m m
i i i iy y
X
y X y X
y X y X
µ β
γ β µ γ β
µ γ β µ γ β
  −    − − − −      − − − −  
 (2.6) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * *
1 1 2 1 3
* * * * *
1 2 2 2 3
* * * * *
1 3 2 3 3
2
2 2* * *
1 2 3
2
Cov , , | , ,
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
m m m
y y y y y
m m m m m m
i i i i y y y y y
m m m
y y y y y
y y y
σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ
   = Σ =     
yθ  (2.7) 
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and 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
1
*
2
*
3
*
1
*
21
*
3
| , ,
| , ,
| , ,
i
i
i
m mm
iy
m m m
iy
m m m
iy
E y
E y
E y
µ
µ
µ
    Σ        = Σ          Σ    
y
y
y
θ
θ
θ
    (2.8) 
 
The covariance matrix ( )2 miσ  in (2.7) and the vector of means in (2.8) can be 
estimated by Gibbs sampling (Casella and George, 1992) from the joint distribution 
of ( )* * *1 2 3, ,i i iy y y  conditional on parameters ( ) ( )( ),m mΣθ  and the observed information 
y . It is useful determining first the distribution of ( )* * *1 2 3, ,i i iy y y . After recalling that 
2γ  and 3γ  are only structural shifts in the second and third equations of (2.4) and 
given the distribution of the disturbances in (2.3), the distribution of ( )* * *1 2 3, ,i i iy y y  at 
iteration m  is ( ) ( )( ),m miN µ Σ , where 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
2 1 2 2
3 1 3 3
m
i
m m m
i i i
m m
i i
X
y X
y X
β
µ γ β
γ β
  = +   + 
 and ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 3
1 2 2 2 3
1 3 2 3 3
1 m m
m m m m
m m m
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
   Σ =    
  (2.9) 
 
3.2 The Gibbs sampler 
The moments in (2.7) and (2.8) could be easily calculated if the marginal densities 
(conditional on parameters and observed information) of *1iy , 
*
2iy , and 
*
3iy  were 
known. However, obtaining those marginal densities may require solving high 
dimensional integrals. Instead of tackling the problem by integration, the Gibbs 
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sampler provides a way to generate samples from the marginal distributions without 
requiring analytical expressions for the densities. The moments of interest can then be 
estimated from the simulated samples.  
 
The implementation of the Gibbs sampler is straightforward using the definitions in 
(2.9). Before proceeding, let consider the following notation 
 
*
1
*
1*
| *
1
*
  
 
i
j i
i j
j i
ki
y
y
y
y
−
−
+
     =      
#
#
y   
1
1
|
1
 
  
i
j i
i j
j i
ki
X
X
X
X
−
−
+
    =       
#
#
X  ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
  
 
m
m
jm
j m
j
m
k
γ
γ
γ
γ
−
−
+
     =       
#
#
γ   ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
  
 
m
m
jm
j m
j
m
k
β
β
β
β
−
−
+
     =       
#
#
β  
where 1,...,j k=  and k  is the number of equations in the system to estimate (equal to 
3 in our example). 
 
The implementation of the sampler begins with determining the distribution of each 
*
jiy  conditional on the value of the rest of the dependent variables 
*
|i j−y . It is well 
known that, under the normality assumption, this conditional distribution is univariate 
normal. Thus, means | ( )ji i jµ −  and variances 2|j jσ −  at the 1m +  iteration can be 
estimated by 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
* *
| ( ) |
1
* * * *
| | | |
, ,
      cov , cov
m m m
ji i j ji i j
m m m m m
ji j ji i j i j i j j i j j
E y
X y
µ
β
− −
−
− − − − − −
= Σ
 = + Σ Σ − −  
y
y y y X
θ
γ β
    (2.10) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 * *
| |
1 '
* * * * * *
| | |
var , ,
    var cov , cov cov ,
m m m
j j ji i j
m m m m
ji ji i j i j ji i j
y
y y y
σ − −
−
− − −
= Σ
 = Σ − Σ Σ Σ  
y
y y y
θ
     (2.11) 
 
The next step is to sample iteratively from these conditional distributions in order to 
simulate a sample for the unobserved values of each *jiy . These samples will in turn 
allow estimating the values in (2.7) and (2.8). Since the simulations for *iy  must be 
done conditional on its corresponding observed information iy , the implementation 
procedure depends on the structure imposed by iy  on 
*
iy .  
 
The observed counterpart of *1iy  in the first equation in (2.2) is dichotomous with 
*
1iy  
being positive if 1iy  equals one and non-positive if 1iy  equals zero. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to simulate *1iy  from a normal distribution with mean 
( )
1 | ( 1)
m
i iµ −  and variance 
( )2
1 | 1
m
iσ −  truncated below at zero if 1iy  equals one and truncated above at zero if 1iy  
equals zero. 
 
Variables *2iy  and 
*
3iy  are both observed when having positive values. Consequently, 
it is only necessary to simulate them when 2 0iy =  and 3 0iy = , respectively. Thus, 
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these variables must be simulated from normal distributions with means ( )| ( )mji i jµ −  and 
variances ( )2 |
m
ji jσ −  truncated above at zero when ( )2,3jiy j =  equals zero. When 
0jiy >  set *ji jiy y= . 
 
Sampling from a truncated normal distribution can be easily accomplished by using 
the inverse distribution method. As an example, assume ( )* 2,y N µ σ∼  and y  is 
limited to be in the interval [ , ]l u . Then according to Devroye (1986, p39), a random 
draw from the truncated normal distribution of y  is given by  
 
( )( )1 l u ly P U P Pµ σ −= + Φ + −   (2.12) 
 
Where l
lP µσ
− = Φ   , u
uP µσ
− = Φ    and U  is a random draw from the standard 
uniform distribution. MATLAB’s pseudo random generator (Moler, 1995) was used 
to simulate the sampling from U  in this study. As an alternatively to the use of 
pseudo random numbers in the sampling, the use of randomized low-discrepancy 
sequences or quasi-random numbers has been proposed in order to reduce Monte 
Carlo noise and speed up convergence (Liao, 1998; Jank, 2004). 
 
A complete set of starting vectors *iy  is necessary to begin the Gibbs sampler. In this 
study *jiy  was set equal to zero ,i j∀  when the observed variable was dichotomous 
and equal to jiy  when censored. The simulation was then repeated iteratively until 
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completing a sequence 
( )*(1) *( ),...,
mK
i iy y , where 
( )mK  is a number large enough to 
ensure convergence. Following Wei and Tanner (1990), it is more efficient to begin 
with a small ( )1K  and progressively increase ( )mK  as m  increases. A simple linear 
rate of increment was used here. Then eliminate a number burnk  of simulations from 
the beginning of the sequence. The remaining observations in the sequence are used 
to estimate ( )2 mjiσ  and ( )mjiµ  in (2.7) and (2.8) according to 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * *
1 1 2 1 3
* * * * *
1 2 2 2 3
* * * * *
1 3 2 3 3
2
2 2* * *
1 2 3
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆcov , , | , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
m m m
y y y y y
m m m m m m
i i i i y y y y y
m m m
y y y y y
y y y
σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ
   = Σ ≈     
yθ  
 
Where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
*( ) * *( ) *
1
1ˆ
1
m
ri si
burn
K
m k k
ri ri si simy y
k kburn
y y y y
K k
σ
= +
= − −− − ∑  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
*
** *
1
1| , ,
m
ji
burn
K
m m m k
ji ji jimy
k kburn
E y y y
K k
µ
= +
 = Σ ≈ =  − ∑yθ  
 
Notice that when *jiy  is fully observed (i.e. when 
*
ji jiy y= ) then ( )* *ˆ 0
ri si
m
y y
σ =  and 
( )
*     , ,
ji
m
ijy
y m r sµ = ∀ .  
 
3.3 Maximization Step 
After obtaining ( )2 mjiσ  and ( )mjiµ  we are ready to move to the Maximization step. From 
(2.5) and (2.6) we maximize  
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )13 1, | , ln 2 ln tr | , ,2 2 2m m m mc iiN NE Qπ −  Σ Σ = − − Σ − Σ Σ    ∑A , y yθ θ θ θ    (2.13) 
 
Note that the use of the Gibbs sampler has permitted us to circumvent the estimation 
of the high dimensional integrals present in (2.21). Also notice that, except for the 
covariance matrices ( )2 miσ  present in the terms, the expression in (2.13) is the log-
likelihood function of a system of linear equations, where the unobserved information 
has been replaced by its expected values. Thus, in a certain sense the latent continuum 
has been restored. Similarly to Meg and Rubin (1993) and Natarajan et al. (2000), I 
use two conditional maximization steps in order to maximize the expression in (2.13) 
with respect to θ  and the elements in Σ . The first maximization step maximizes 
(2.13) with respect to θ  conditional on ( )mΣ  to produce ( )1m+θ . This is followed by a 
maximization on the elements of Σ  conditional on the recently updated ( )1m+θ  in 
order to obtain ( )1m+Σ . 
 
It is clear from (2.6) that the maximizer in the first conditional maximization is the 
generalized least square estimator 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )*11 11 ' 'm m m md N d d N yX I X X I µ−− −+  = Σ ⊗ Σ ⊗    θ    (2.14) 
 
where  
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1
2
3
0 0
0 0
0 0
d
X
X X
X
  =    
 

 , 2X  and 3X  are the matrices [ ]1 2 iy X#  and [ ]1 3  iy X#  
respectively, NI  is the identity matrix of dimension N  and 
( )
*
m
y
µ  is a column vector 
of dimension Nk  constructed by stacking the elements ( )*
ji
m
y
µ  from (2.8) in the 
following way 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * * * * * *
11 12 1 21 2 31 3
'
, ,..., , ,..., , ,...,
N N N
m m m m m m m m
y y y y y y y y
µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ=    (2.15) 
 
After plugging (2.14) into (2.13), ( )1m+Σ  is obtained by maximizing  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 113 1| , ln 2 ln tr | , ,2 2 2m m m m mc iiN NE Qπ+ +−  Σ Σ = − − Σ − Σ Σ    ∑A , y yθ θ θ     (2.16) 
 
with respect to the ( )3 3 1 / 2 2 5− + =  different elements in Σ . The maximization of 
(2.16) can be accomplished with the routine FMINUNC in Matlab. Unlike the log-
likelihood function in (2.21), the function in (2.16) is simple enough to obtain an 
analytical expression for its gradient. This is useful since no time need to be spent in a 
numerical estimation of the gradient by the optimization routine.  
 
3.4 Convergence issues and stopping rules 
 Literature discussing convergence of the MCEM is scarce and it suggests that 
MCEM convergence relies mainly on properties of the deterministic EM algorithm 
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and the Gibbs sampler. Convergence of the EM algorithm has been discussed by 
Dempster et al. (1977), Boyles (1983) and Wu (1983) and convergence properties of 
the Gibbs sampler are studied in Geman and Geman (1984) and Casella and George 
(1992). In one of these studies, Wu (1983) clarifies a common misconception about 
the superior properties of the EM algorithm in converging to a global maximum. He 
shows that, like other maximization methods, the EM algorithm converges 
monotonically to some stationary point of a bounded log-likelihood function; 
however there is no guarantee that point is the global maximum. Consequently, the 
EM algorithm is susceptible to starting value problems and may converge to a local 
maximum, a saddle point, or even may not converge to a unique optimum, getting 
trapped in a connected set of local maxima instead (e.g. a plateau in the objective 
function).  
 
In the same study cited above, Wu shows that if the log-likelihood function is well 
behaved and it has only one stationary point (a maximum) then the EM sequence will 
converge to the unique maximizer. This property has two immediate implications for 
unimodal and differentiable log-likelihood functions. First, the EM algorithm has a 
greater approximation area to the global maximum or, in other words, its estimates 
are less sensitive to starting values than other optimization techniques. Second and 
directly related to the first implication, the EM estimates are confined to lie in the 
parameter space at each iteration. Consequently, problems with estimates of the 
disturbance covariance matrix like negative variances or correlation coefficients with 
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absolute values greater than one (which are frequent under Newton and Quasi-
Newton techniques) do not happen when using the EM algorithm. 
 
Some closely related issues must be discussed before finishing the implementation of 
the MCEM algorithm. They are the criteria to use in order to determine the size of the 
Gibbs sample ( )mK  and to determine when convergence has been attained. Wei and 
Tanner (1990) have indicated that it is inefficient to begin with large Gibbs samples 
since MCEM estimates are likely to be far from the true maximizer during the first 
iterations. Rather it is more reasonable to begin with small samples and make ( )mK  an 
increasing function of m  in order to reduce the Monte Carlo error as the algorithm 
approaches the maximizer. However, there is not a single criterion about the way 
( )mK  must be increased at every iteration. 
 
Some approaches consider separately the issues of determining the optimal size of the 
Gibbs simulation and monitoring convergence. Thus, McCulloch (1997) considers 
rather abrupt increments in the size of the Gibbs sample every time that m  had 
achieved certain arbitrary values, while McCulloch (1994) uses a linear rate of 
increment. Convergence monitoring in these works is accomplished by plotting the 
expected log-likelihood versus iteration number and the algorithm is stopped 
manually when the process is observed to stabilize (Wei and Tanner, 1990; Natarajan 
et al., 2000). 
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More elaborate approaches consider evaluating the Monte Carlo error at iteration m  
and use that estimation both to determine ( )1mK +  and to evaluate convergence. These 
methods can be classified either as likelihood-distance-based or as parameter-
distance-based depending on whether they focus on likelihood differences 
( )( ) ( )( )1j jc cE E −−      A Aϑ ϑ  or parameter differences ( ) ( )1j j−−ϑ ϑ , where ( )jϑ  is the 
estimation of the parameter vector at iteration j . The idea is that if parameter or 
likelihood differences show variation no greater than the Monte Carlo error then the 
estimation has been saturated by random variation and the simulation size must be 
increased in the next iteration. In a complementarily way, a stopping rule can be 
implemented by establishing a target level for the Monte Carlo error. Examples of the 
likelihood-distance-based approach can be found in Chan and Ledolter (1995) and 
Eickhoff et al. (2004). Perhaps the sounder parameter-distance-based approach 
belongs to Booth and Hobert (1999). They use a Taylor series approximation to 
construct a confidence ellipsoid around ( )1m+ϑ , where the length of the ellipsoid axis 
on every dimension of the parameter space is a measure of the MC error on the 
respective dimension. Thus, if the estimate ( )mϑ  is contained in the ellipsoid, the 
current estimate ( )1m+ϑ  is swamped in MC error and ( )1mK +  must be increased.  
 
This study uses a linear rate of increment for the size of the Gibbs sample and a 
stopping ruled based both on likelihood and parameter distances. The idea is simply 
to automate the plotting method of Wei and Tanner (1990) by introducing the 
following criteria: 
 25
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1
1
310
j j
j
M
j M J
c c
c
E E
E
−
−
−
= −
−       <  
∑ A AA
ϑ ϑ
ϑ   (2.17) 
( ) ( )
( )
1
2
1max 10
j jM
k k
jk j M J k
ϑ ϑ
ϑ
−
−
−
= −
−  <   ∑  
where ( )jkϑ  is the estimate of the k  component of the parameter vector at iteration j, 
M is the current number of iterations, and J is a researcher choice. In this example J 
was set equal to 0.25 M× . The algorithm was stopped only when both criteria were 
satisfied for at least ten consecutive iterations. This last requirement was introduced 
to avoid false convergence due to the tendency of the MCEM algorithm to stall 
temporarily before reaching the maximizer. The criteria in (2.17) are simple to 
implement and, somewhat, they are more stringent than any of those presented in the 
articles mentioned above and may increase unnecessarily the number of iterations 
required for convergence. However, given the speed of today’s computer, the 
computational cost is not very high. 
 
3.5 Estimation of the Information matrix 
The asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are not among the outputs of the EM 
algorithm and, typically, additional code needs to be appended to the algorithm in 
order to estimate them. Louis’s identity (Louis, 1982) was used in this study to obtain 
a Monte Carlo estimation of the information matrix (Guo and Thompson, 1992, 
Ibrahim et al., 2001). A description of how the approach works is as follows. Let the 
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complete information likelihood function be ( );cL xθ , where θ  is the full set of 
parameters to estimate. Then, the observed log-likelihood can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
;
; ln ; ln ; ln ; ; |
;
c
c c mLL L
L
= = − = −A A Axy y x x x y
y
θθ θ θ θ θθ  (2.18) 
where ( ) ( )( )
;
; | ln
;
c
m L
L
=A xx y
y
θθ θ  is the logarithm of the complete information 
likelihood function conditional on the observed information. After taking second 
derivatives on both sides of (2.18) we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2; ; ; |
' ' '
c m∂ ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
A A Ay x x yθ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ , 
 
which can be written in terms of information matrices in order to apply the “missing 
information principle” (Orchard and Woodbury, 1972) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ); ; ;c mI I I= −y x x | yθ θ θ     (2.19) 
 
where ( ) ( ); ;c cI E H = −  x xθ θ  is the complete information matrix, 
( ) ( )2 ;;
'
c
cH
∂= ∂ ∂
A x
x
θθ θ θ  is the complete information Hessian, and ( );mI x | yθ  can be 
viewed as the missing information matrix. Louis (1982) showed that this last matrix 
could be written as 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ; |
; Var ;
'
                                        ; ; ' ; ; '
m
m c
c c c c
I E S
E S S E S E S
 ∂  = − = =   ∂ ∂ 
     −     
A x y
x | y x
x x x x
θθ θθ θ
θ θ θ θ
      (2.20) 
 
where ( ) ( );; ccS ∂= ∂
A x
x
θθ θ  is the complete information score vector. All the 
expectations are taken with respect to the distribution ( )| , EMf x y θ , where EMθ  is 
the final MCEM estimation of θ . The evaluation of all the expectations involved 
commonly prevents the estimation of the observed information matrix in (2.20) by 
direct calculation. Monte Carlo estimates of the expected complete information 
Hessian and score can be used to circumvent the problem and estimate the terms in 
the right hand side of (2.20). To sum up, the procedure implemented in this study is: 
 
Step 1. Use the Gibbs sampler described above to simulate a sequence 
*( )*(1) ,..., burnR ri i
+y y  while holding EMθ = θ . Eliminate a number burnr  of simulations 
from the beginning of the sequence. 
Step 2. Use the remaining simulations to estimate the expectation of the complete and 
missing information matrices by using 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*( )
1 1 1
1;
N N R
c rc EM c EM EM r
i i i i i
i i r
I E H ; H ; |
R= = =
 = − ≅ − ∑ ∑ ∑x x y yθ θ θ  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
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1 1 1, ,
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    = −        
 ≅ −  
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
x | y x x x x
y y y y y y y y
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
 
 
Expressions for the contributions from each observation to the Hessian and score are 
standard results from the theory of the multivariate normal distribution. Finally, plug 
the Monte Carlo estimates of ( );cI θ x  and ( );mI θ x | y  in (2.20) and take the inverse 
of the resulting estimate of ( );I θ y  to get the asymptotic covariance matrix of EMθ . 
 
4 The numerical integration approach and comparison with the MCEM 
algorithm.  
In this section I use both numerical integration and the MCEM algorithm to estimate 
the parameters of the same model using the same data. The performances of the two 
approaches are then compared. I applied the two methods on data from a survey 
administered to Maryland farmers in 1998 in order to evaluate a conservation cost-
sharing program. For a detailed description of the survey see Lichtenberg and Smith-
Ramírez (2004). 
 
The econometric setting attempts to estimate the effect of cost-sharing payments on 
farmers’ conservation efforts. The model to solve is the equation system in (2.2), 
where the dependent variables are defined as follows. Variable *1iy  is the amount of 
cost-sharing money awarded to the farmer, *2iy  is the number of conservation 
practices used, and *3iy  is the share of land on which these practices are implemented. 
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None of these variables is observed fully. We observe only a dichotomous indicator, 
1iy , of whether cost-share funding was awarded, i.e.  
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while the observed counterparts of *2iy  and 
*
3iy  are assumed censored from below at 
zero, i.e.  
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4.1 Estimation by numerical integration 
The general form of the observed-information likelihood function for the equation 
system (2.2) is 
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However, since all possible combinations of values for the dependent variables do not 
exist in the data set used, the observed information likelihood can be reduced to 
(Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramírez, 2004) 
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where ( )1 2 2 3 3, , , ,β γ β γ β=θ , ( ) ( )
' 1
1 222 exp
2
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ε εε  is the m -
dimensional normal pdf and ( )| , | ,j k l ji ki liφ ε ε ε  is the normal pdf of jiε  conditional on 
( ),ki liε ε . After a little algebra the log-likelihood of the observed data can be written 
as 
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 (2.21) 
where ( )mΦ ⋅  is the m -dimensional standard normal cdf. 
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In this study the log-likelihood function in (2.21) was maximized using the routine 
FMINUNC in Matlab. I programmed the 3-dimensional standard normal cdf 
according to the methodology proposed by Steck (1958), which allows reducing the 
3-dimensional integral to functions involving only 1-dimensional integrals of 
exponential functions and the univariate normal cdf. The information matrix was 
calculated from a finite-difference estimation of the Hessian of the objective function.  
 
Starting values in the approximation area of the maximum were very hard to find. A 
first attempt using OLS estimates failed to converge. A second approach attempted to 
estimate the equations in (2.2) by pairs and then use a combination of the resulting 
estimates as starting values for the 3-equation system. Matlab routines using OLS 
estimates as starting values were written to estimate these smaller equation systems. 
However, although convergence in the system constituted by the second and third 
equations was easily accomplished, neither the routine for the system constituted by 
the first and second equations nor the one for the system constituted by the first and 
third equations converged. The routines either ceased to improve in the search for the 
optimum or the correlation between the disturbances escaped the parameter space. 
 
Finally, a grid search was implemented. To decide the dimension of the grid, 
estimation attempts were made by fixing one, two, three and four parameters in Σ . 
Convergence was attained only after one of the two variances and all the correlation 
coefficients were fixed. Thus, a four-dimensional grid search was implemented on 
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those parameters. Ten equally spaced points from –0.9 to 0.9 were chosen for the 
correlation coefficients and four equally spaced points from 2 to 8 were taken for 
2εσ , 
which generated a 4,000-point grid. The time required solving a grid of this size 
easily becomes unaffordable when the objective function involves high dimensional 
integrals as in (2.21); however, the actual number of grid points that need to be used 
can be drastically reduced by two ways. First, it must be noticed that Σ  must be kept 
positive definite at every moment during the estimation. Many points in the grid 
described above do not satisfy that requirement and they must be eliminated from the 
search. Second, since we are interested in finding a neighborhood of the global 
maximum only, by careful monitoring of the search it is possible to exclude large sets 
of grid points surrounding low values of the objective function. Notice that this last 
approach is advisable only when the objective function behaves smoothly. A real risk 
of missing the global maximum exists otherwise. By proceeding this way the grid 
search used in this study required less than 350 points to locate a point in the 
approximation area of the global maximum. However, despite of the significant 
reduction in the size of the grid, it took about 60 hours1 to solve the grid search and 
make the final estimation to obtain the maximum maximorum.. Results2 of the final 
estimation are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
4.2 Estimation by the MCEM algorithm 
The general MCEM method has been already discussed in Section 3. Different sets of 
starting values were used in this work to reduce the possibility of missing the global 
                                                          
1 On an AMD Athlon XP-M 2000+, 512 MB RAM, Windows XP, Matlab 6.5. 
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maximum. For a quite broad array of starting values, the MCEM algorithm always 
converged to the same maximizer and always kept the estimates in the interior of the 
parameter space. 
 
The iteration paths for the likelihood function and selected parameters are presented 
in Figure 2.1. OLS estimates were used as starting values for the parameters in θ  and 
an identity matrix was used for the covariance matrix of the disturbances. The routine 
converged after 393 iterations when using the stopping criteria described above. The 
Gibbs sampler was started with 300 simulations and increased by 15 simulations at 
every iteration of the EM algorithm, i.e. ( ) ( )300 15 1mK m= + − . The number of 
dismissed simulations, burnk , was kept constant at 150. The algorithm converged after 
2.5 hours3. 
 
A Gibbs sample with 3300R =  and 300burnr =  was used to estimate the information 
matrix. Results of the Monte Carlo EM estimation are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 I have not included the variable names since these results are presented only for comparison 
purposes. Details can be found in Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramírez (2004). 
3  On an AMD Athlon XP-M 2000+, 512 MB RAM, Windows XP, Matlab 6.5. 
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Table 2.1. ML estimates obtained by Numerical Integration and Monte Carlo EM algorithm 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Numerical Integration MCEM Numerical Integration MCEM Numerical Integration MCEM Param
eter Estim. St. err. Estim. St. err. 
Para
meter Estim. St. err. Estim. St. err. 
Param
eter Estim. St. err. Estimate St. err. 
     2γ  -3.7074 1.0037 -3.6860 0.6633 3γ  -0.9229 0.5486 -0.9163 0.3701 
1,1β  -0.7881 0.8856 -0.7987 0.8661 2,1β  5.6232 1.7064 5.6173 1.6708 3,1β  2.4189 0.8131 2.4572 0.8024 
1,2β  -0.2282 0.1515 -0.2259 0.1481 2,2β  -0.8770 0.2572 -0.8756 0.2557 3,2β  -0.2127 0.1234 -0.2175 0.1237 
1,3β  0.2126 0.1246 0.2108 0.1156 2,3β  0.5992 0.2212 0.5981 0.2189 3,3β  0.2409 0.1055 0.2474 0.1055 
1,4β  0.5194 0.2436 0.5245 0.2364 2,4β  0.7933 0.5164 0.7917 0.5109 3,4β  0.1260 0.2447 0.0919 0.2452 
1,5β  0.1809 0.0598 0.1807 0.0591 2,5β  0.1665 0.1404 0.1656 0.1376 3,5β  -0.0077 0.0670 -0.0045 0.0660 
1,6β  -0.0254 0.0374 -0.0255 0.0349 2,6β  0.1776 0.0683 0.1777 0.0682 3,6β  0.1279 0.0322 0.1279 0.0326 
1,7β  -0.6267 0.4196 -0.6193 0.4132 2,7β  -0.3023 0.9046 -0.2999 0.8983 3,7β  0.2795 0.4265 0.1697 0.4310 
1,8β  0.6602 0.2999 0.6603 0.3009 2,8β  2.9621 0.9029 2.9580 0.8907 3,8β  0.1504 0.4280 0.1656 0.4259 
1,9β  0.2370 0.4209 0.2368 0.4196 2,9β  0.9667 0.9991 0.9667 0.9861 3,9β  0.0294 0.4704 0.0008 0.4715 
1,10β  -0.5050 0.4405 -0.5042 0.4364 2,10β  -0.4288 0.9658 -0.4272 0.9424 3,10β  -0.9509 0.4544 -0.9809 0.4512 
1,11β  -0.4257 0.4467 -0.4211 0.4372 2,11β  1.1889 0.9724 1.1912 0.9567 3,11β  -0.1385 0.4567 -0.1933 0.4570 
1,12β  0.7764 0.5478 0.7765 0.5484 2,12β  1.9579 1.4739 1.9549 1.4671 3,12β  1.0929 0.6942 1.1256 0.6993 
1,13β  1.5578 0.6997 1.5608 0.6946 2,13β  2.4029 2.0006 2.3937 1.9660 3,13β  0.3721 0.9544 0.3632 0.9447 
1,14β  0.8016 0.3230 0.7989 0.3147 2,14β  2.7804 0.5673 2.7797 0.5651 3,14β  0.9317 0.2699 0.9430 0.2720 
1,15β  -0.3057 0.3915 -0.2967 0.3720 2,15β  0.8671 0.8077 0.8654 0.8013 3,15β  -0.5440 0.3825 -0.6334 0.3864 
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Numerical integration and MCEM parameter estimates
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Figure 2.2. Comparison between numerical integration and MCEM estimates. 
 
Graphical comparisons between the estimates obtained by numerical integration and 
those obtained by the MCEM algorithm are depicted in Figure 2.2. The remarkable 
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match in the parameter estimates proves that both approaches converged to the same 
maximizer. The main difference, of course, is the robustness of the MCEM to the 
election of starting values, which allowed achieving the solution in less than one-
twentieth of the time needed when using numerical integration. Certainly, the use of 
QMC integration or the use of probability simulators may help to reduce the 
estimation time when using the numerical integration approach. Yet, these methods 
only provide an alternative to estimate the integral terms in the likelihood function. 
They do not help neither with problems of “practical” identification nor with the 
starting value problem. 
 
The matching for the standard errors in Table 2.1, however, is not that close. The 
lower graph in Figure 2.2 shows that, in general, the standard errors obtained by using 
a finite-difference Hessian are larger than those produced by Louis’ method. In an 
attempt to reduce the disparity, the simulation size used to estimate the information 
matrix in the Monte Carlo approach was enlarged from 3300R =  to 5300R = . 
However, no significant change was observed in the estimates.  
 
In order to determine if the origin of the mismatch was in the Hessian estimated by 
finite differences, the Hessian estimation was repeated several times reducing 
iteratively the size of the perturbation size4. This approach reduced the mismatch, 
which suggests that the origin of the problem is in the numerical estimation of the 
Hessian. The size of the perturbation, however, cannot be reduced arbitrarily. The 
                                                          
4 By perturbation size I mean the magnitude of the finite difference used to calculate the numerical 
derivatives 
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numerical integration approach used to estimate the likelihood function in (2.21) may 
be free of Monte Carlo error but it has inaccuracies originated in the numerical 
integration procedure. This fact sets a lower bound for the size of the perturbation that 
we can use to estimate the Hessian: it cannot be smaller than the estimation error of 
the likelihood function. The accuracy of the numerical integrals can, certainly, be 
increased; however, it is well known that the computational costs of proceeding that 
way increment exponentially. Figure 2.2 presents the standard errors for a percentage 
perturbation equal to 10-4. 
 
The limitations of the numerical Hessian approach contrast with the advantages of the 
stochastic version of the Louis’ method. The Louis’ method is easy to implement and 
we can use it to obtain standard errors with any needed accuracy simply by increasing 
the number of simulations. Doing this is relatively inexpensive since the score and the 
Hessian of the expectation in (2.5) exist in closed forms and their calculation involves 
only matrix algebra. 
 
5 Implementing the Monte Carlo EM algorithm for models with latent 
endogenous regressors. 
This section extends the MCEM algorithm presented in the last section in order to 
include systems of structural equations, i.e. cases where latent variables show up on 
both sides of the equations. Only for the purpose of illustrating the flexibility of the 
method, consider again the equation system (2.2) but now with *1iy  instead of 1iy  at 
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the right-hand side of the second and third equations, and 1iy  defined as a polytomous 
variable  
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The structural model is now  
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Thus, under the normality assumption, the complete data likelihood function can be 
written as 
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Σ  is defined as in (2.3). 
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Correspondingly, the complete information log-likelihood function and its 
expectation are  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 '3 1, , | ln 2 ln ln tr2 2 2c i iiN NNπ ε ε−Γ Σ = − − Γ − Σ − Σ∑A xβ  (2.24) 
( ) ( ) 1 '3 1, , | ln 2 ln ln tr
2 2 2
c
i i
i
N NE N Eπ ε ε−    Γ Σ = − − Γ − Σ − Σ     ∑A xβ  (2.25) 
 
Where N  is the total number of observations and the expectation operator indicates 
expectation conditional on observed information and distribution assumptions. The E-
step at iteration 1m +  requires the calculation of  
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  (2.26) 
 
Where ( )2 miσ  and ( )*
ji
m
y
µ  are defined as in expressions (2.7) and (2.8). Some small 
modifications must be introduced to the Gibbs sampler implemented in section 3.2 in 
order to estimate these moments. The conditional mean ( )| ( )mji i jµ −  must be now 
estimated according to 
 
 42
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1* * * * *| ( ) | | | | |cov , covm m m m m mji i j ji j ji i j i j i j i j j i j jX yµ β −− − − − − − − − = + Σ Σ − −  y y y y Xγ β  
where  ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
  
 
m
m
jm
j m
j
m
k
γ
γ
γ
γ
−
−
+
     =       
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#
γ  
To construct a sample conditional on the observed information as defined in (2.22) 
proceed as follows. For every 1 1ia y aκ κ +< ≤  simulate *1iy  from a normal distribution 
with mean ( )1 | ( 1)mi iµ −  and variance ( )21 | 1miσ −  truncated below at aκ  and truncated above at 
1aκ + . Do the same for every 0,1,2,...kκ = , where k  is the number of intervals 
defined by the polytomous variable.  
 
Simulations for the unobserved values of *2iy  and 
*
3iy  are obtained in the same way as 
in Section 3.2. 
 
The maximization step does not differ significantly from the case analyzed previously 
except by the presence of Γ  in the log-likelihood function, which motivates a slight 
change in the arguments of the conditional maximization steps. The objective 
function is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )13 1ln 2 ln ln tr , , | , , ,2 2 2 m m miiN NN Qπ − − − Γ − Σ − Σ Γ Σ Γ Σ  ∑ yβ β  (2.27) 
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The first conditional maximization updates β  conditional on the elements in Γ  and 
Σ . From (2.26) the estimate of β  can still be written as a generalized least squares 
estimator: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )*11 11 ' ' ˆm m m md N d d N yX I X X I µ−− −+  = Σ ⊗ Σ ⊗  β    (2.28) 
 
where  
1
2
3
0 0
0 0
0 0
d
X
X X
X
  =    
 , ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *'ˆ m m mNy yIµ µ= Γ ⊗ , NI  is the identity matrix of 
dimension N  and ( )*myµ  is the column vector defined in (2.15). 
 
The second conditional maximization updates Γ  and Σ  conditional on the updated 
estimate of β . Numerical techniques must be used in this step to maximize 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )113 1ln 2 ln ln tr , | , , ,2 2 2 m m m miiN NN Qπ +− − − Γ − Σ − Σ Γ Γ Σ  ∑ yβ β  
 
with respect to the elements in Γ  and Σ  and obtain estimates for ( )1m+Γ  and ( )1m+Σ . 
Notice that the second term in the objective function vanishes in this particular 
example as Γ  is triangular. 
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It is evident that the combination of the Expectation and Maximization steps as 
described here can be extended to admit systems with a larger number of linear 
equations involving any type of latent variables. Only small adjustments to the Gibbs 
sampler in order to take into account the types of latent variables involved are 
necessary. 
 
6 Final remarks 
This chapter has presented a MCEM algorithm suitable for estimating systems of 
simultaneous equations and structural models that contain latent variables. The 
applicability of the model is independent of whether the latent variables appear in the 
model as dependent variables or as endogenous regressors. The general formulation 
presented in Section 5 permits that the algorithm can be applied to solve a variety of 
models with latent structures from a one-equation tobit to a n-equation multinomial 
probit. Only small adjustments in the Gibbs sampler are necessary to shift from one 
model to another in order to internalize the types of latent variables and the nature of 
the unobserved information involved.  
 
The MCEM algorithm as formulated here has a number of advantages over more 
traditional methods. First, it does not require integrating the unobserved information 
out from the likelihood function. This characteristic reduces the estimation time 
dramatically as no numerical integration is needed and, similarly to methods based on 
probability simulators, permits to solve problems involving more than three latent 
variables. Second, it reduces the estimation of the vector of slopes to the calculation 
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of a GLS estimator and numerical optimization is required only to estimate the 
elements in the disturbance covariance matrix. Since the GLS estimator and the 
gradient and Hessian of the objective function for the estimation of the disturbance 
covariance matrix have closed forms, almost no time is consumed in the 
Maximization step and it is easier to keep the whole set of parameters in the 
parameter space. This property of the MCEM reduces substantially the problems of 
“fragile” identification and selection of starting values, which are serious limitations 
of traditional approaches. Third, it can accommodate potentially any linear-in-
parameters equation system. This is valid not only for the cross-sectional models 
mentioned above but also for panel data models and stochastic frontier models, where 
the random effects and efficiency terms can be treated as one more latent variable. 
Finally, the estimation of standard errors by the Louis method circumvents the 
limitations associated to the estimation of numerical Hessians by finite-difference 
methods, which is the standard in traditional procedures. The accuracy of the 
estimates of the standard errors can be improved easily by increasing the number of 
simulations of a closed form of the Information matrix, which is much less expensive 
than reducing the perturbation size in the numerical Hessian approach. 
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Chapter 3: How Green Are Cost Sharing Payments? A Joint Disaggregated 
Evaluation of the Interactions between Farmers’ Conservation 
and Production Decisions 
 
1 Introduction 
In the last twenty years farm support policies have shown an important shift towards 
the conservation of farmland natural resources and the reduction of pollution from 
agricultural activities. In the United States, for example, the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), a 36-million-acre land retirement program, was established in 1985 
with the aim of reducing agricultural non-point source pollution and preserving 
natural resources for the future by taking land out of production. Eleven years later, 
the 1996 Farm Bill replaced four existing programs (the Agricultural Conservation 
program, the Water Quality Control Program, the Great Plains Conservation Program, 
and the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program) by the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). Complementarily to CRP, EQIP does not retire 
land from production but aims to reduce non-point source pollution generated on 
working land and to sustain farmland productivity. The 2002 Farm Bill has reinforced 
the emphasis on working-land programs by authorizing a fivefold increment in 
EQIP’s budget and the creation of the Conservation Security Program (CSP). 
 
Underlying land retirement programs like CRP is the presumption that rental 
payments will stop production activities on land enrolled without altering the use of 
the land either on non-participant farms or on the non-enrolled tracts of land of 
participant farms. If this presumption does not hold then these programs may have 
 47
unintended consequences that undermine their effectiveness. Wu (2000), for example, 
has shown that farmers adjust to CRP actions by bringing marginal land into 
production. The expansion is a consequence of the rise in output prices caused by the 
reduction in crop acreage5 and substitution effects derived from economies of scale 
and requirement of fixed inputs in farm production. Wu estimates that these 
unintended effects have offset 9% and 14% of the CRP benefits from reduction in 
water pollution and wind erosion, respectively. 
 
Working-land cost-sharing programs like EQIP provide technical assistance and 
monetary incentives to farmers to implement best management practices (BMPs). The 
underlying presumption of these programs is that payments will change the 
technology used in existing operations without altering the scope or intensity of farm 
operations. Or, in other words, the adoption of BMPs will reduce negative 
environmental spillovers and resource degradation without changing the amount of 
land cropped and without increasing the intensity at which fertilizer and pesticides are 
used. Whether these premises are true or not has not been researched explicitly to 
date. Following the results presented for CRP, it is logical to ask whether the 
enrollment in a working-land conservation cost-sharing program affects production 
decisions and whether the way farmers adjust offsets part of the benefits of the 
program.  
 
                                                          
 
5 To date, land enrolled in CRP amounts 9% of the cropland in the contiguous states, an area roughly 
the size of Iowa (Roberts and Lubowski, 2004). 
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One possibility is that adoption of conservation technologies makes it profitable to 
expand cropping, in which case expansion of cropping onto sensitive areas may 
reduce or eliminate the environmental gains generated by the adoption of the 
technology (Wu 2000). Other losses may come as result of cropping intensification. 
For instance, if adoption of conservation practices increases the use of double 
cropping, then a higher load of fertilizers and pesticides may be introduced in the 
ecosystem. Thus, it is clear that determination of the effect of cost sharing on acreage 
cropped requires analyzing the influence of conservation technology on cropping 
patterns at both the extensive and the intensive margins.  
 
Most practices that aim to reduce soil erosion are land-quality augmenting since they 
alter (in fact, they reduce) the impact of land quality on productivity (Caswell and 
Zilberman, 1986). Reduced tillage, contour farming, strip cropping, grade 
stabilization, and rock- grass-lined waterways are all land quality augmenting as they 
prevent soil runoff and, by doing so, they reduce the impact of land steepness on 
farming activities. Although some studies about the effect that land-quality-
augmenting technology may have on cropping exist, they focus on technologies 
designed primarily to increase productivity (Lichtenberg, 1989). The effect of 
adoption of conservation technology on acreage cropped has not been studied to date, 
however. Theoretical analyses (Lichtenberg, 2004; Malik and Shomaker, 1993) 
suggest that adoption of conservation technology may increase cropping at the 
extensive margin. Cropping expansion, i.e. the extensive margin effect, would happen 
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as consequence of the higher profitability that conservation technology presents on 
highly erodible land when compared with traditional cropping techniques. 
 
To understand this point better, let A  be the total acreage of the farm, sA  the acreage 
under single cropping, and dA  the acreage under double cropping. By double 
cropping I mean the combination of two short-season crops planted on the same field, 
where one of the crops is planted following immediately the harvest of the other. 
Thus, double cropping allows obtaining two harvests from a single tract of land in a 
single season. Total acreage cropped or tilled in the farm is 2s dA A+ , while the share 
of land cropped, i.e. the acreage used for planting crops, is only s dA A+ . In this 
framework, an extensive margin effect is a change in the sum s dA A+ , i.e. an increase 
or decrease in the total area planted regardless of how many times that area is cropped 
during the season. An intensive margin effect, on the other hand is a change in dA , 
the area of the farm cropped more intensively. Notice that if double cropped acreage 
increases at the expenses of single cropped area only, there will be no extensive 
margin effect even though there is a positive intensive margin effect.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, intensive margin effects of conservation 
technology have not been investigated empirically to date. Intensification via double 
cropping may arise from labor and time savings. For instance, no-till and minimum 
till techniques reduce labor and machinery time in crop production because no 
plowing is necessary before seeding. 
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There is another reason to analyze unintended effects of adoption of conservation 
technology on production decisions. Land retirement programs and conservation cost 
sharing programs are classified under the green-box exemption of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO); i.e. they are excluded from payment reduction commitments. 
EQIP has been considered “...the first green program of any significant magnitude in 
the U.S that is not a land retirement program” by Batie (1999). Existence of the 
green-box exemption is the WTO recognition of market failures to provide adequate 
incentives to farmers in order to supply socially optimum amounts of public goods 
and to protect natural resources (Klonsky and Jacquet, 2003). Green-box payments, as 
defined by the WTO (2004), must 
 
“… have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production. “  
 
But do programs that promote the adoption of conservation technology fulfill this 
requirement? As indicated before, conservation technologies may increase land 
productivity by enhancing land quality or reducing the impact of land quality on 
productivity. Other technologies may reduce production costs. For instance, nutrient 
management and integrated pest management improve efficiency of fertilizer and 
pesticide applications respectively and, by doing so, reduce variable costs of 
production. Hence, programs that cost share conservation technology may expand 
production indirectly and, consequently, distort trade. 
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Working-land cost-sharing programs have traditionally been funded at more modest 
levels than land-retirement programs. However, the new emphasis placed by the 2002 
Farm Bill on working-land programs suggests that this situation may change in the 
near future. Evidences of this new tendency are the authorization of a fivefold 
increase in the EQIP budget and the creation of the Conservation Security Program 
(CSP). Increased spending, a new program, and improvements in targeting and 
implementation as result of experience accumulated since creation of EQIP will 
certainly increase the environmental impact of cost sharing programs. However, it is 
also likely that associated impacts on farm production become more evident, which 
may bring these programs under a more stringent scrutiny of the WTO. 
Comprehension of the interactions between conservation and production decisions is 
necessary in order to design cost sharing programs having its larger impact on the 
provision of environmental amenities and minimal effects on trade. 
 
The goal of this paper is threefold. First, I estimate the effect of adoption of 
conservation technology on cropping at both the extensive and intensive margins, 
focusing on three of the most popular practices used to control soil erosion in 
Maryland. Secondly, I estimate the effect of cost-sharing programs on the adoption 
levels of the three practices mentioned above. Finally, I estimate the extent to which 
cost-sharing payments have influenced the scope and intensity of cropping operations 
in Maryland. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two 
presents the data and develops and estimates the econometric model. Section Three 
discusses the results and policy implications. Section Four concludes. 
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2. Data, econometric model and estimation 
2.1 Data  
Data used in the econometric estimation come from a University of Maryland 
BMP/Cost Share Survey administered in 1998. The Maryland Agricultural Statistics 
Service (MASS) conducted the survey. Stratified random sampling was used to 
ensure a sufficient number of responses from commercial operations, especially 
larger ones. Samples were drawn from the MASS master list of farmers and MASS 
provided expansion factors for deriving population estimates. The survey was 
administered using a computer assisted telephone survey instrument. The data set 
gathers information from 354 farms including: farm operator characteristics, land 
ownership, cropping patterns, livestock numbers, farm finance, farm topography, 
BMPs used in the farm, acreage served by each practice, last year at which cost 
sharing was received, and type and distance to the closest water body. 
 
2.2 The econometric model.  
In the empirical part of this study I analyze the impact of cost-share payments on the 
adoption of three soil conservation practices. Simultaneously, I estimate the effects 
that adoption of these practices has on the scope and intensity of cropping operations 
and on grassland and permanent vegetative cover. I consider two soil-erosion 
reducing practices for the analysis: reduced tillage and grass- or rock-lined 
waterways. Additionally I include filter strips and riparian buffers, which are treated 
as a single practice. They are described briefly in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Description of conservation practices  
 
Practice Description 
Filter 
strips/riparian 
buffers 
Filter or buffer strips are land areas of either planted or indigenous 
vegetation, situated between a potential pollutant-source area and a 
surface-water body that receives runoff. A properly designed filter strip 
provides water-quality protection by reducing the amount of sediment, 
organic matter, and some nutrients and pesticides in the runoff before 
they enter the surface-water body. 
Reduced tillage 
I include here no-till and minimum till. In both cases, the surface is 
covered by crop residue after planting to reduce soil erosion by water, or 
where soil erosion by wind is the primary concern. In no-till systems, 
planting is the only operation which disturbs the soil. Minimum till 
allows some tillage to solve weed problems and to deal with high 
moisture and heavy clay soil conditions. 
Grass- or rock-
lined waterways 
Grading natural drainage ways to form a smooth channel, then planting 
with grass or lining with rock in order to protect the drainage way from 
gully erosion and trap sediment running off a field. 
 
These three practices were chosen because they are among the most frequently cost-
shared and thus they provide more representative treatment groups. Program 
participation is low in Maryland, but it is probably greater than in many other states 
because of Maryland’s state programs aimed at the protection of the Chesapeake Bay 
(Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramírez, 2004). None of the practices surveyed had been 
implemented in more than the 45% of the farms at the time of the survey, and, for 
most practices, fewer than 10% of the farms that had implemented those practices had 
received some funding (see Table 3.2).  
 
It can be noted from Table 3.2 that use of filter strips and riparian buffers were asked 
as separate questions in the survey, but appear as a single practice in Table 3.1. Filter 
strips and riparian buffers are used essentially for the same purpose: filtering 
pollutants from soil runoff before it reaches a surface water body. Often the terms are 
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used interchangeably although the term filter strips usually refers to strips planted 
with grass while the term riparian buffers usually refers to strips planted with brush or 
trees. Given the similarity in their functions, I have aggregated the participation data 
of both practices in order to increase the size of the treatment group.  
 
Table 3.2. Use of conservation practices and participation in cost sharing 
programs 
 
Proportion of Farmers 
Conservation Practice using the practice 
with CS 
using the practice 
without CS 
not using the 
practice 
Critical area seeding 0.013 0.270 0.717 
Filter strips 0.032 0.300 0.668 
Riparian buffer(s) 0.009 0.190 0.801 
Contour farming 0.014 0.200 0.786 
Strip cropping 0.005 0.270 0.725 
Minimum till or no till 0.027 0.450 0.523 
Grade stabilization 0.002 0.150 0.848 
Grass- or rock-lined 
waterways 0.076 0.220 0.704 
Terraces 0.002 0.050 0.948 
Diversions 0.019 0.090 0.891 
Sediment troughs 0.003 0.060 0.937 
Permanent vegetative cover 0.008 0.310 0.682 
Wildlife habitat 0.025 0.280 0.695 
 
The farmer decision process is multivariate in nature and the econometric model must 
acknowledge the interdependency between production and conservation decisions as 
much as possible. Estimating the effect of conservation technology adoption on 
acreage cropped and acreage in grassland or under permanent vegetative cover 
involves the modeling of the following decisions: 1) whether to participate or not in a 
cost sharing payment program, 2) the size of the cropping operation, 3) acreage 
allocated to pastures, hayland and permanent vegetative cover, and 4) whether to use 
each conservation technology and how much land to use it on. 
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Consistent estimation of the effects that this study attempts to measure requires 
modeling these decisions jointly. Therefore, the following model is proposed 
 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 1 2 2 2
*
3 3 3 1 3 3 3
*
4 4 4 1 4 4 4
                       Cost sharing equation
     Cropping intensity equation
      Vegetative cover equation   
     Fi
i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
y X
y X y X
y X y X
y X y X
β ε
β η ε
β η ε
β η ε
= +
= + +
= + +
= + +
*
5 5 5 1 5 5 5
*
6 6 6 1 6 6 6
lter strips equation
      Minimum/no tillage equation
    Grass or rock-lined waterways equation
i i i i i
i i i i i
y X y X
y X y X
β η ε
β η ε
= + +
= + +
 (3.1) 
where the left-hand side variables are defined as follows. 
 
*
1iy  is a latent variable giving the amount of cost sharing received by farm i . It 
signals farmer’s and agency’s preferences, and it can be seen as the equilibrium 
between farmer’s willingness to apply for cost sharing (cost-sharing demand) 
and agency’s willingness to provided it (cost-sharing supply). Only a binary 
variable, 1iy , is observed, taking the value 1 if cost sharing has been granted for 
the implementation of at least one of the practices included in Table 3.1 of for 
planting or preserving pastures, hayland or permanent vegetative covers, and 0 
if not, i.e. 
*
1
1 * *
1 1
       
    
0 if   0
if   0
i
i
i i
y
y
y y
 ≤=  >
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*
2iy  is a latent variable measuring the total acreage cropped in the farm as a 
proportion of total acreage operated. Acreage used to construct this variable 
includes land used in corn, soybeans, small grains, vegetables, and tobacco. It 
was also included the acreage under the category “other crops”, which were not 
specified in the survey. In order to represent the actual size of cropping 
operations and following the discussion about intensive and extensive effects in 
the introduction, double-cropped acreage is summed twice. Thus, the observed 
counterpart of *2iy  is given by (I have dropped the subindex i  here) 
( )2 2 /s dy A A A= + , which range from 0 to 2. The minimum value is obtained 
in farms with no cropping operations, while the maximum is attained when all 
the land operated is double cropped. The desired level of cropping *2iy  is 
modeled here as a latent variable whose observed counterpart is censored from 
below at zero and from above at 2. 
*
2
* *
2 2 2
*
2
       
    
       
0 if   0
if   0 2
2 if   2
i
i i i
i
y
y y y
y
 ≤= < < ≥
 
 
Variables *3iy , 
*
4iy , 
*
5iy , and 
*
6iy  are the levels at which vegetative cover 
(including pastures, hayland and permanent vegetative cover), filter or buffer 
strips, reduced tillage, and grass- or rock-lined waterways are used in the farm, 
respectively. Their observed counterparts 3iy , 4iy , 5iy  and 6iy , are estimated by 
the ratio between the acreage served by the respective practice and total acreage 
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operated. Thus, they are censored from below at zero and from above at 1. 
Summarizing: 
*
* *
*
       
    
       
0 if   0
if   0 1               3, 4,5,6
1 if   1
ji
ji ji ji
ji
y
y y y j
y
 ≤= < < = ≥
 
 
Vectors   1,...,6kjX k =  in (3.1) represent exogenous explanatory variables whose 
descriptions are presented in Table 3.3. Coefficients kβ  are parameter vectors related 
to exogenous regressors, kη  are vectors of parameters taking into account the effect 
of possible interactions between cost-share funding and exogenous covariates, and kjε  
are normally distributed error terms with zero means and covariance matrix  
12 13 14 15 16
2
12 2 23 24 25 26
2
13 23 3 34 35 36
2
14 24 34 4 45 46
2
15 25 35 45 5 56
16 26 36 46 56 66
1 σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
    Σ =       
  (3.2) 
where 21σ  has been set  equal to one following the usual normalization required to 
identify the parameters in equations that involve dichotomous dependent variables. 
 
A sequential process is implicit in this model. In the first stage farmers apply for cost 
sharing and the administrative body of the program decides which projects to fund. 
This process is modeled by the first equation in the equation system (3.1). In the 
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second stage farmers decide about conservation actions and production operations 
conditional on cost sharing received.  
 
Table 3.3 describes the exogenous control variables jiX . Farmer characteristics like 
age (both current and at the last year of receiving cost-share funding), farming 
experience, and education were included. Farmer age is used as a measure of farmer’s 
time horizon and is expected to have a negative impact on the adoption of 
conservation technology. Experience and education, on the other hand, are expected 
to influence adoption positively as more experienced and educated farmers should 
have a better appreciation of private and social benefits of conservation technology.  
 
Farm topography is considered by introducing two variables HIGH and 
MODERATE. HIGH is the percentage of land operated with a slope equal to or 
higher than 8%. MODERATE is the percentage of land operated with a slope higher 
than 2% but lower than 8%. Due to its impact on soil erodability, topography should 
be an important determinant of both the probability of receiving a cost-share award 
and farmers’ decisions regarding adoption of the three BMPs in Table 3.1.  
 
Tenancy is incorporated as the percentage of land operated that is rented in. Farmers 
are widely believed to have less incentive to invest in conservation on rented land 
since long run returns from conservation accrue to the landlord, not the tenant. 
According to this perception, farmers who rent a larger share of the land they operate 
should be less willing to apply for cost sharing and should invest in conservation 
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projects that are smaller in size and scope. However, it can be argued that some 
private benefits from conservation technologies accrue in the short run (Soule et al., 
2000). As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, conservation tillage reduces 
time and labor cost since no plowing is necessary before seeding. Many conservation 
practices are land-quality enhancing, which means that they may increase profitability 
of marginal land. Also, since machinery used in conservation tillage requires high 
investments and maintenance costs, farmers may rent land in to increase the size of 
their cropping operations and thus reduce fixed costs per acre. Additionally, practices 
like contour farming and strip cropping help to improve crop yields by preventing 
that soil and fertilizer wash away in highly sloped areas that receive intense rain 
during the crop season. Consequently, if use of the technologies included in Table 3.1 
is profitable in the short run, it is not that clear whether the effect of tenancy on 
adoption is positive or negative. 
 
Total acreage operated was included to control for the effects of farm size. Large 
farms may have more incentives to apply for cost sharing since they are likely to have 
a more diverse topography. Program administrators, on the other hand, may target 
preferentially those farms that are likely to be large pollution sources such as large 
cropping or cattle operations. Farm size may also influence adoption decisions. For 
instance, conservation technologies may exhibit economies of scale, as might be the 
case with reduced tillage since larger farms can save proportionally more time in 
machinery operations and can spread the fixed costs of machinery over more acreage. 
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Table 3.3. Dependent and exogenous explanatory variables 
 
Variable Name Description Mean Standard Deviation
Cost share  
Binary variable indicating whether the farmer has 
received cost sharing between 1995 and 1998 
inclusively for implementation of at least one of the 
practices in Table 3.1 or for planting or preserving 
hayland, pastures or other vegetative cover (yes=1). 
0.121 0.327 
Acreage 
cropped 
proportion 
Ratio of land planted to crops to land operated. 
Double cropped acreage is counted twice. 0.335 0.366 
Vegetative 
cover share 
Proportion of land under hayland, pasture or 
permanent vegetative cover.  0.439 0.351 
Filter/buffer 
share 
Proportion of land served by filter strips and/or 
riparian buffers 0.100 0.298 
Reduced tillage 
share 
Proportion of land cropped using minimum or no 
tillage techniques 0.203 0.306 
Grass/rock 
waterways share
Proportion of land served by grass or rock lined 
waterways 0.039 0.150 
CSAge1  Age of the farmer in the most recent year cost share funding was received since 1995 59.907 12.295 
CSExperience1 
Years of experience as farm operator at the most 
recent year cost share funding was received since 
1995 
28.297 14.224 
Age2,4,5,6  Current farmer age  60.032 12.259 
Experience2,4,5,6 Current years of experience as farm operator 28.422 14.222 
College1,2,4,5,6 Farmer has college education or higher or has attended to technical school (yes = 1) 0.357 0.480 
Income1,2,4,5,6 Proportion of total farmer income obtained from farm operations 0.453 0.399 
High1,2,4,5,6 Proportion of highly sloped land in the total acreage operated (slope > 8%) 0.075 0.166 
Moderate1,2,4,5,6 Proportion of moderately sloped land in the total acreage operated (slope 2-8%) 0.304 0.343 
Rented1,2,4,5,6 Proportion of total land operated that is rented in 0.170 0.298 
Land1,2,4,5,6 Total acreage operated (acres) 182.73 278.24 
Cattle3 
Number of grazing animals in the farm including 
beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, and horses (animal 
units)  
38.643 76.736 
Distance1,4 Distance to the nearest water body (miles) 0.778 3.119 
Dairy2,5 The farm has more than 5 animal units of dairy cattle (yes = 1) 0.132 0.115 
NDCattle2,5 The farm has more than 5 animal units of non-dairy cattle (yes = 1) 0.492 0.250 
 61
Poultry2,5 The farm has more than 5 animal units of poultry (yes = 1) 0.151 0.128 
1 Included as regressor in equation 1; 2 Included as regressor in equation 2; 3 Included as regressor in 
equation 3; 4 Included as regressor in equation 4, 5 Included as regressor in equation 5, 6 Included as 
regressor in equation 6. N=354 
 
A continuous variable giving the distance to the closest water body (stream, lake, 
pond, wetland, or the Chesapeake Bay) was included. Since protection of water 
quality in the Bay and its tributaries is the expressed top priority of Maryland’s 
conservation programs, it is expected that proximity to water bodies increases the 
likelihood to receive funding. Finally, a set of three operation type dummies (Dairy, 
NDCattle, and Poultry) was included to control for preferences of operations other 
than cropping. Dairy takes the value one if there is a dairy operation on the farm 
whose size exceeds five animal units6, and takes the value zero otherwise. NDCattle 
takes the value one if the aggregated size of non-dairy cattle operations (beef cattle, 
swine operations, horses, sheep and lambs) exceeds five animal units, and takes the 
value zero otherwise. Poultry takes the value one if the there is a poultry operation on 
the farm whose size exceeds five animal units, and takes the value zero otherwise. 
 
Before proceeding to the model estimation, I discuss the procedure to calculate the 
effect of program participation on the level of adoption of the different practices 
involved in this study. I also present the method to estimate the extensive and 
intensive effects of cost sharing on acreage cropped.  
 
                                                          
6 I used the Animal Units Calculation Worksheet of the State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
resources to calculate the number of animal units on each farm. The worksheet is available from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pdf/ag/cafo/form340025a.pdf. 
 
 62
2.3 Estimating the effects 
2.3.1 Effect of cost sharing on adoption level 
First, I present the procedure used to estimate the effects of cost sharing payments on 
the adoption level of the different practices. I evaluate these effects by estimating the 
change in the share of land served by each practice 3,4,5,6j = . I distinguish three 
cases: 
 
1) Farmers who have implemented practice j  and have received cost sharing. If the 
current observed share of land covered by practice j  in farm i  is jiy , then the effect 
of cost sharing is: 
1
1 1 1
| 0
     Pr 0 1| 0 | 0 1, 0 Pr 1| 0
ji ji ji i
ji ji i ji ji i ji i
S y E y y
y y y E y y y y y
 ∆ = − = 
     = − < < = < < = − = =     
 (3.3) 
 
2) Farmers who have implemented practice j  and have received no cost sharing. If 
the current observed share of land covered by practice j  in farm i  is jiy , then the 
effect of cost sharing is: 
( )
1
1 1 1
| 1
     1 Pr 1| 1 | 0 1, 1 Pr 1| 1
ji ji i ji
ji i ji ji i ji i ji
S E y y y
y y E y y y y y y
 ∆ = = − 
     = − = = < < = + = = −     
 (3.4) 
where the first term in (3.4) incorporates the assumption that a farmer that has been 
using practice j  without cost sharing will not stop using the practice as consequence 
of being awarded funding 
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3) Farmers who have not implemented practice j . In this case, the effect of cost 
sharing is: 
1
1 1 1
| 1 0
      Pr 0 1| 1 | 0 1, 1 Pr 1| 1
ji ji i
ji i ji ji i ji i
S E y y
y y E y y y y y
 ∆ = = − 
     = < < = < < = + = =     
 (3.5) 
 
Probabilities 1Pr 1| 1ji iy y = =   and 1Pr 1| 0ji iy y = =   in (3.4) can be calculated by 
( )
( )
12 1 1
1 1 1
1
, ,
j
ji j j
i
j
i
X
X
X
ε ε
η ββ ρσ
β
 + − Φ   
Φ  and ( )
12 1 1
1 1 1
1
, ,
j
ji j
i
j
i
X
X
X
ε ε
ββ ρσ
β
 −Φ − −   
Φ −  respectively, 
where 
j kε ερ  is the correlation between jε  and kε . The calculation of the other 
probabilities and expectations in (3.4) is more complicated. However, following the 
work of Rosenbaum (1961) it is possible to write  
 
1 1Pr 0 1| 1 | 0 1, 1ji i ji ji iy y E y y y   < < = < < = =     
( ) ( )
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) }
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
, , , ,
                                            | 1 ,
ji j j ji j jj j
i j i j
j j
ji j j
i
ji ji j j ji ji j j i ij j
X X
X X
X
X
E X X X
η β η ββ ρ β ρσ σ
η ββ
ε η β ε η β ε β
   + + −   Φ −Φ      = + +Φ
 − + < < − + > − 
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(3.6) 
 
and  
1 1Pr 0 | 0 | 0, 0ji i ji ji iy y E y y y   > = > = =     
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   −       Φ −    − −Φ − − −Φ − −             
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 (3.7) 
 
To estimate the effect of cost-share funding on the share of land in vegetative cover 
we can use expressions (3.3) through (3.5) with 3j = . Whereas the net effect of cost 
sharing on cropping can be estimated by using the same formulas with 2j = . 
 
The bivariate and trivariate normal distribution functions contained in expressions 
(3.3) through (3.7) were programmed in Matlab. Sample estimates of the effects were 
calculated by estimating the individual effects and then calculating the (weighted) 
mean. Finally, standard errors of these effects were estimated by the delta method. 
 
2.3.2 Extensive and intensive margin effects 
The estimation of the extensive and intensive margin effects of cost sharing needs 
some further elaboration. Recalling the notation used in the introduction, let A  be 
total acreage operated, sA  the single-cropped acreage, dA  the double-cropped 
acreage, vA  the acreage in vegetative cover, and oA  acreage under other use (e.g. 
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machinery storage, livestock facilities, housing, roads). Thus, we have 
v os dA A A A A= + + + , while the proportion of acreage cropped to total acreage, in the 
way defined in this article, is given by  
 
2
2s d s d d c dA A A A A A Ay
A A A A A
+ += = + = +  
 
where /cA A  is the share of the farm used to plant crops. 
 
Consider now the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1: The change in acreage used in machinery storage, livestock facilities, 
housing or roads, 0A∆ , due to cost sharing funding is negligible. This is not a 
restrictive assumption since cost sharing provided for implementing practices in 
Table 3.1 or for planting or preserving hayland, pastures or other vegetative covers 
should not be used in building, housing or roads. It could be argued, on the other 
hand, that the construction of machinery storage is a possible indirect effect of cost 
sharing the adoption of minimum tillage. However, this effect (if existing) is likely to 
be very small compared with the direct effects affects sA∆  and dA∆  (a farmer willing 
to invest in machinery and storage facilities is expected to use that machinery).  
 
Assumption 2: Total acreage operated, A , does not change as consequence of cost-
sharing funding. This is a more debatable assumption, mainly because practices like 
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minimum tillage may incentive farmers to rent land in to reduce financial and 
maintenance cost of the machinery and take advantage of reductions in cropping time 
and labor costs. 
 
If the two assumptions above hold, then changes in /cA A  and 2y  caused by cost 
sharing funding can be written as follows 
 
v o vcA A A AA
A A A A A
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆∆= − − ≅ −    (3.8) 
 
( )v o
2
v
A
                           
c d d
d c d
A A AA A Ay
A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∆ − −∆ ∆ ∆∆ = + = +
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆≅ − + = +
   (3.9) 
 
Thus, the change in the share of land used for cropping resulting from cost sharing 
(extensive margin effect) can be estimated by the negative of the change in the share 
of land used in vegetative cover. Complementarily, the change in the share of land 
under double cropping (intensive margin effect) can be estimated by the sum of the 
change in the acreage cropped share 2y∆  and the change in the share of land under 
vegetative cover v /A A∆ . Alternatively, the intensive margin effect can be estimated 
by the change 2y∆  minus the extensive margin effect /cA A∆ .  
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One of the two possible extensive margin effects of adopting conservation technology 
is moving farmers from having only grassland (hayland and pastures) or other 
vegetative covers to start cropping activities. The other extensive margin effect is the 
expansion or reduction in cropping on farms that already practiced cropping before 
adopting the technology. While equation (3.8) provides a way to estimate the overall 
extensive margin effect, the analysis of the first component mentioned above is also 
desirable because it gives us the possibility of studying how conservation cost-sharing 
programs might change farming patterns in places were cropping was absent 
previously.  
 
The all three practices included in this study can be implemented either on grassland 
or on cropland. According to the survey data, 24% of the farmers using buffer/filter 
strips do not crop, 8% of the people using minimum tillage do not crop, and 30% of 
the people using rock- or grass-lined waterways practice no cropping. Since these 
people do not crop, they must use these practices on grassland (hayland and/or 
pastures). Grassland is associated frequently to land with limitations (e.g. high 
erodibility) that prevent a more intensive use of the soil. Minimum tillage and 
waterways protection, however, makes land less susceptible to erosion, which might 
incentive farmers to move part of their land from grassland to cropland. 
 
To estimate the effect of conservation technology on the probability of moving from 
no-cropping to cropping operations, I calculate the difference between the probability 
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of growing crops having adopted technology  j  and the probability of growing crops 
without implementing that technology. Mathematically 
 
2 1 2 1Pr Pr 0 | 0, 0 Pr 0 | 0, 0cropping i i ji i i jiy y y y y y   ∆ = > = > − > = =     
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
2 2
3 1 1 3 1 1
2 2
2 1 1 2 1 1
, , , , , , , , , ,
        4,5,6
, , , ,
j j j j
j j
i j ji j i j ji j
i i
j j
ji j ji j
i i
j j
X X X X
X X
j
X X
X X
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
β β β ββ ρ ρ ρ β ρ ρ ρσ σ σ σ
β ββ ρ β ρσ σ
   Φ − − − Φ − − − −         = − =   Φ − − Φ − −         
  (3.10) 
 
In order to discuss the pure effect of the technology, I estimate this effect clean of 
cost sharing influence (i.e. conditional on 1 0iy = ). Thus, the effect will be positive if 
the adoption of conservation technology that makes farming less dependent of land 
quality creates incentives for practicing cropping. A positive effect could open the 
possibility for an unintended effect of cost sharing programs: they might be 
(inadvertently) promoting cropping in farms where cropping was not practiced 
before. 
 
2.4 Estimation by the Monte Carlo EM (MCEM) algorithm 
The number of equations involved and the presence of latent variables complicates 
the estimation of the equation system (3.1) by maximum likelihood. The observed 
counterparts of the dependent variables of all the six equations are either dichotomous 
or censored variables, which introduces 6-dimensional integrals in the likelihood 
function. In order to avoid the estimation problems associated to traditional methods, 
I use here the MCEM algorithm formulated in Chapter 2.  
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The complete information likelihood function for our problem is standard and can be 
written as follows 
 
( ) ( )
' 1
1 23
1, , | exp
22
c i i
i
L π
−  ΣΣ = −  Σ   
∏y ε εη β  
 
where ( )'1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6β β η β η β η β η β=θ , and 
( )'1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i iε ε ε ε ε ε=ε  
 
Thus, the complete data log-likelihood function is  
 
( ) ( ) 1 '1 1, | 3ln 2 ln tr
2 2
c
i i
i
N π −  Σ = − + Σ − Σ      ∑A yθ ε ε   (3.11) 
 
E-Step. The expectation of expression (3.11) can be written as  
( ) ( ) 1 '1 1, | 3ln 2 ln tr
2 2
c
i i
i
E N π Ε−     Σ = − + Σ − Σ         ∑A yθ ε ε  (3.12) 
 
where the expectation is conditional on observed information and distribution 
assumptions. The E-step at iteration 1m + , requires the calculation of  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )'| , , | , ,m m m mi i iQ E  Σ = Σ y yθ θ ε ε θ  
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    (3.13) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 * * * * * *1 2 3 4 5 6Cov , , , , , | , ,m m mi i i i i i iy y y y y yσ = Σ yθ    (3.14) 
and ( ) ( ) ( )* * 1,..., 6| , ,       
ji
m m m
jiy
jE yµ = = Σ yθ      (3.15) 
 
M-Step. Following Meg and Rubin (1993), it is advisable to replace the M-step by 
two conditional M-steps. The first conditional M-step maximizes  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )11 13ln 2 ln tr | , ,2 2 m miiN Qπ −  − + Σ − Σ Σ      ∑ yθ θ   (3.16) 
 
with respect to the elements in θ  conditional on ( )mθ  and ( )mΣ . It is easy to see from 
(3.13) that the maximizer in this first conditional maximization can be written as a 
generalized least square estimator 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )*11 11 ' 'm m m md N d d N yX I X X I µ−− −+  = Σ ⊗ Σ ⊗    θ    (3.17) 
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The second conditional M-step estimates ( )1m+Σ  by maximizing the following function 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )111 13ln 2 ln tr | , ,2 2 m m miiN Qπ +−  − + Σ − Σ Σ      ∑ yθ θ   (3.18) 
 
with respect to the elements of Σ  conditional on ( )1m+θ . 
 
There remains the implementation of the Gibbs sampler necessary to estimate the 
matrices iQ  in the objective function. Since the simulations for 
*
iy  must be done 
conditional on its corresponding observed information iy , the implementation 
procedure depends on the structure imposed by iy  on 
*
iy .  
 
The observed counterpart of *1iy  is dichotomous with 
*
1iy  being positive if 1iy  equals 
one and non-positive if 1iy  equals zero. Accordingly, we simulate 
*
1iy  from a normal 
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distribution with mean ( )1 | ( 1)mi iµ −  and variance ( )21 | 1miσ −  truncated below at zero if 1iy  
equals one and truncated above at zero if 1iy  equals zero.  
 
Variable *2iy  is censored from below at zero and from above at 2. Consequently, we 
simulate *2iy  from a normal distribution with mean 
( )
2 | ( 2)
m
i iµ −  and variance ( )22 | 2miσ −  
truncated above at zero when 2iy  equals zero and truncated below at 2 when 2iy  
equals 2. If 20 2iy< <  then *2 2i iy y= . Variables ( )*   3, 4,5,6jiy j =  are all censored 
from below at 0 and from above at 1. Thus, the unobserved components must be 
simulated from normal distributions with means ( )| ( )mji i jµ −  and variances ( )2 |mji jσ −  
truncated above at zero if 0jiy =  and from normal distributions truncated from below 
at 1 if 1jiy = . If 0 1jiy< <  set *ji jiy y= .  
 
In this study the Gibbs sampler was started with 600 simulations and increased by 15 
simulations at every iteration of the MCEM algorithm. The number of dismissed 
simulations, burnk , was kept constant at 150. A simulation of size 3600R =  and 
600burnr =  was used for the estimation of the information matrix and asymptotic 
standard errors. The full set of interactions between the cost-sharing variable 1iy  and 
regressors in Table 3.3 was considered in an initial estimation. Only those interactions 
that were significant at 5% were kept in the model and a second estimation was 
carried out. Results of the second estimation are presented in Table 3.4. 
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3 Estimation results and discussion 
Overall, signs of the coefficients in Table 3.4 match expectations. Several of then are 
not significant statistically, however. None of the interaction coefficients in 2η  was 
significant and all of them were dropped from the second equation in the last 
estimation. A Wald test for the null hypothesis of the interactions coefficients 
simultaneously equal to zero gave a result of 10.1356 (6 df), which does not allow 
rejecting H0. 
 
Table 3.4. Estimation results 
 
Equation Variable Estimate As. St. error As. t-value p-value 
Constant -0.0872 0.5112 -0.1705 0.8648 
CSAge -0.0238 0.0099 -2.4078 0.0168 
CSExperience 9.31E-04 8.24E-03 0.1129 0.9102 
Education -0.1162 0.1923 -0.6043 0.5462 
Income 0.4503 0.2410 1.8683 0.0629 
High 0.8713 0.4357 1.9995 0.0466 
Moderate 0.0442 0.2560 0.1727 0.8630 
Rented -0.2221 0.2937 -0.7564 0.4501 
Land 6.14E-04 2.28E-04 2.6941 0.0075 
Cost-Sharing 
Distance -0.0563 0.0380 -1.4838 0.1391 
Constant 0.6269 0.1395 4.4935 0.0000 
Age -0.0073 0.0025 -2.9568 0.0034 
Experience 0.0022 0.0021 1.0381 0.3002 
Education -0.0998 0.0494 -2.0225 0.0442 
Income 0.2890 0.0690 4.1892 0.0000 
High 0.1784 0.1355 1.3169 0.1891 
Moderate -0.0418 0.0684 -0.6109 0.5418 
Rented 0.2930 0.0852 3.4401 0.0007 
Land 1.73E-04 8.15E-05 2.1296 0.0342 
Dairy -0.0033 0.0698 -0.0479 0.9619 
NDCattle -0.3260 0.0473 -6.8977 0.0000 
Cropping 
intensity 
Poultry 0.0155 0.0969 0.1603 0.8728 
Constant -0.2213 0.1335 -1.6581 0.0986 
Age 0.0096 0.0020 4.8346 0.0000 
Education 0.0237 0.0487 0.4861 0.6273 
Income -0.1444 0.0642 -2.2494 0.0254 
High -0.0963 0.1407 -0.6844 0.4944 
Moderate 0.4280 0.0670 6.3874 0.0000 
Rented 0.0233 0.0869 0.2681 0.7889 
Land -4.04E-04 8.86E-05 -4.5563 0.0000 
Cattle 1.16E-03 2.54E-04 4.5632 0.0000 
Vegetative 
Cover 
y1i x Constant 0.3830 0.3723 1.0288 0.3046 
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y1i x Age -9.03E-04 5.65E-03 -0.1600 0.8730 
y1i x Education 0.3722 0.1376 2.7048 0.0073 
y1i x Income -0.0630 0.1653 -0.3814 0.7032 
y1i x High 0.4563 0.2920 1.5628 0.1194 
 
y1i x Moderate -0.6939 0.1898 -3.6566 0.0003 
Constant 0.0292 0.2196 0.1328 0.8945 
Age -0.0109 0.0038 -2.8918 0.0042 
Experience 0.0132 0.0030 4.4248 0.0000 
Education 0.1730 0.0756 2.2886 0.0229 
Income -0.2413 0.1017 -2.3735 0.0184 
High 0.2157 0.2036 1.0595 0.2904 
Moderate -0.1010 0.1077 -0.9378 0.3493 
Rented 0.1723 0.1299 1.3265 0.1859 
Land -8.68E-05 1.19E-04 -0.7277 0.4675 
Distance -0.0064 0.0117 -0.5466 0.5852 
y1i x Constant -1.3761 0.5509 -2.4979 0.0131 
y1i x Age 0.0282 0.0080 3.5422 0.0005 
y1i x Education -0.1220 0.1907 -0.6399 0.5228 
y1i x Income 0.7821 0.2358 3.3171 0.0010 
y1i x High -0.6306 0.4773 -1.3212 0.1877 
Filter 
Strips/Riparia
n Buffers 
y1i x Moderate 0.6113 0.2514 2.4313 0.0158 
Constant 0.7410 0.2101 3.5270 0.0005 
Age -0.0200 0.0039 -5.0805 0.0000 
Experience 0.0118 0.0034 3.4559 0.0006 
Education -0.2202 0.0790 -2.7886 0.0057 
Income 0.1879 0.1063 1.7671 0.0784 
High -0.1684 0.2437 -0.6910 0.4902 
Moderate 0.3441 0.1038 3.3143 0.0011 
Rented 0.3592 0.1270 2.8289 0.0051 
Land 2.53E-04 1.18E-04 2.1361 0.0337 
Dairy -0.0521 0.1004 -0.5192 0.6041 
NDCattle -0.1655 0.0711 -2.3288 0.0207 
Poultry -0.3225 0.1445 -2.2327 0.0265 
y1i x Constant -1.0767 0.5725 -1.8805 0.0612 
y1i x Age 0.0125 0.0085 1.4803 0.1401 
y1i x Education 0.2213 0.1928 1.1477 0.2522 
y1i x Income 0.2037 0.2350 0.8667 0.3869 
y1i x High 0.8791 0.4353 2.0194 0.0445 
Reduced 
Tillage 
y1i x Moderate -0.1982 0.2661 -0.7446 0.4572 
Constant 0.1833 0.1591 1.1519 0.2505 
Age -0.0142 0.0030 -4.7342 0.0000 
Experience 0.0098 0.0026 3.7601 0.0002 
Education 0.0218 0.0574 0.3795 0.7046 
Income -0.1731 0.0751 -2.3028 0.0221 
High 0.1232 0.1745 0.7057 0.4811 
Moderate 0.3298 0.0759 4.3476 0.0000 
Rented 0.0166 0.0965 0.1722 0.8634 
Land 5.14E-05 8.15E-05 0.6310 0.5286 
y1i x Constant -0.8046 0.4606 -1.7470 0.0819 
y1i x Age 0.0191 0.0068 2.7835 0.0058 
y1i x Education 0.0672 0.1492 0.4505 0.6528 
y1i x Income 0.2767 0.1854 1.4919 0.1370 
Grass- or 
Rock-lined 
Waterways 
y1i x High -0.4409 0.3977 -1.1087 0.2686 
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 y1i x Moderate 0.0487 0.2039 0.2390 0.8113 
12σ  0.0352 0.0128 2.7615 0.0062 
13σ  -0.2457 0.0107 -22.9442 0.0000 
14σ  -0.4657 0.0104 -44.7536 0.0000 
15σ  0.1948 0.0175 11.1297 0.0000 
16σ  -0.1309 0.0113 -11.5416 0.0000 
22σ  0.1525 0.0071 21.3699 0.0000 
23σ  -0.0418 0.0051 -8.1903 0.0000 
24σ  -0.0080 0.0070 -1.1495 0.2515 
25σ  0.1183 0.0080 14.7478 0.0000 
26σ  0.0147 0.0046 3.2105 0.0015 
33σ  0.1558 0.0068 22.8854 0.0000 
34σ  0.1127 0.0063 18.0363 0.0000 
35σ  -0.0238 0.0067 -3.5440 0.0005 
36σ  0.0463 0.0047 9.9103 0.0000 
44σ  0.3018 0.0105 28.7160 0.0000 
45σ  -0.0025 0.0091 -0.2745 0.7839 
46σ  0.1228 0.0073 16.7785 0.0000 
55σ  0.2920 0.0142 20.5548 0.0000 
56σ  0.0523 0.0065 8.0199 0.0000 
 
66σ  0.1207 0.0060 20.1927 0.0000 
 
3.1 Determinants of cost sharing allocation 
It is remarkable that, although the three practices involved in this study control soil 
and nutrient runoff and most cost sharing programs in Maryland have water quality 
protection as a stated priority, distance to water bodies is not a significant determinant 
of cost sharing allocation. Furthermore, only one of the variables controlling for land 
slope is statistically significant. More than focusing on environmental characteristics, 
program administrators seem to target preferentially large operations (the coefficient 
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of LAND is significant at 1% in the cost-sharing equation). This outcome could be 
evidence of attempts to maximize the acreage served by the practices being cost 
shared. Alternatively it could be an indication of the existence of transaction costs 
restricting the participation of small farmers. For instance, time costs for doing the 
necessary paperwork can be significant for poor farmers or farmers with low 
managerial skills. In relation to this problem, Lynch and Tjaden (2004) observe that: 
“A participant usually has to take part in more than one program or to piggyback 
programs to cover all costs. A number of different agencies run these programs, with 
limited coordination, and each agency has different rules. Often, cost-share payments 
are not made at the same time monetary expenditures occur; landowners may have to 
wait for up to a year for reimbursement”.  
 
The results also indicate that likelihood of receiving cost share declines with farmer 
age. Since it is unlikely that program administrators discriminate by farmer age, this 
outcome indicates probably that older farmers are less willing to go through the 
paperwork required to apply for cost sharing. Additionally, older farmers have shorter 
time horizons, which reduces their willingness to implement practices whose benefits 
accrue on the long run and thus they are less willing to apply for cost-sharing.  
 
The common belief that renters are less willing to engage in conservation effort than 
owners are is not supported by results in Table 3.4. Since it is unlikely that program 
administrators target renters preferentially, the lack of statistical significance of the 
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coefficient of RENTED indicates that renters apply for cost sharing as much as 
owners do7 (for the practices included in this study at least).  
 
3.2 Effects of adoption of conservation technology on cropping decisions 
The changes in the probabilities of starting cropping activities as result of adopting 
conservation technologies are presented in Table 3.5. In order to capture the effects 
free of cost sharing influence, estimates were calculated conditional on no cost-share 
funding (see formula (3.10)) and only on the sub-sample of farms that do not 
participate in cost sharing programs. They are presented for different farm sizes and 
for the sub-sample. 
 
The results in Table 3.5 are in close agreement with the discussion in Section 1. 
Adoption of both reduced tillage and grass- and rock-lined waterways increases the 
likelihood of growing crops. These two practices are land-quality enhancing. They 
alleviate the negative impact of cropping on steep land. Use of reduced tillage reduces 
soil runoff, while grass- or rock-lined waterways prevent gully erosion. Additionally, 
its use decreases time and labor costs. Results indicate that adoption of any of these 
two practices makes cropping profitable in farms where growing crops was not 
profitable before.  
                                                          
7 It is interesting noting that the coefficients of the RENTED variable in the cropping intensity and 
reduced tillage equations are both positive and statistically significant meaning that renters crop more 
and use minimum or no tillage on more acreage than owners do. This result could be considered as an 
indication that renters use reduced tillage to expand cropping on marginal land. The coefficient of 
RENTED in the permanent vegetative cover equation is, however, neither negative nor statistically 
different from zero, which suggests that reduced tillage affects cropping on the intensive rather than 
the extensive margin. 
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Table 3.5. Estimated effects of conservation technology adoption on cropping 
 
Change in probability of practicing cropping Practice Farm size Estimate As. z-value5 
Small1 -0.0128 -0.7918 
Medium2 -0.0046 -0.4037 
Large3 -0.0012 -0.2586 
Filter strip - Riparian 
buffer 
Sample4 average -0.0117 -0.7612 
Small 0.3211 18.7129 
Medium 0.2294 10.7719 
Large 0.1128 4.1011 Reduced Tillage 
Sample average 0.3064 18.3026 
Small 0.0693 3.5922 
Medium 0.0491 3.7365 
Large 0.0185 2.7712 
Grass- or Rock-lined 
Waterways 
Sample average 0.0660 3.6157 
1 Small: farm size is smaller than or equal to 250 acres. 2 Medium: farm size is larger than 250 acres 
and smaller than or equal to 750 acres. 3 Large: farm size is larger than 750 acres. 4 It includes only 
individuals with 1 0iy = . 5 Asymptotic t-values; standard errors were estimated by the Delta method. 
 
The effect of adoption of reduced tillage and grass- or rock-lined waterways on the 
decision about whether or not to crop is decreasing in farm size. This may happen 
because small farms are more land-quality constrained than larger farms. As a 
consequence of their size, medium and large farms have a wider distribution of land 
quality, which means they have a greater likelihood of including tracts of land on 
which raising crops is profitable. Thus, small farms are less likely to have crop 
operations than medium and large farms, all else equal. The adoption of land-quality 
enhancing practices should thus have a proportionately larger average effect on 
smaller farms than on larger ones. 
 
The relation between adoption of filter strips/riparian buffers and cropping presents a 
different situation. Although the related effects in Table 3.5 are not significant 
statistically, their signs suggest that adoption of these practices is associated with a 
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reduction in the probability of cropping (a negative extensive margin effect). Reasons 
explaining a non-positive effect of these practices can be found in the analysis of the 
benefits and costs that the implementation of a filter strip/riparian buffer reports to a 
farmer. Although buffers and filter strips have some private benefits such as 
decreasing soil erosion from adjacent fields, their main benefits are public goods such 
as improved water quality, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation services, and scenic 
amenities (Lynch and Tjaden, 2004). In contrast to reduced tillage and grass- and 
rock-lined waterways, buffers and filter strips are not land-quality enhancing 
practices because they do not make cropping less dependent on land quality and, 
consequently, they do not create incentives to expand cropping. Rather, buffers and 
filter strips may reduce cropping output by removing land from production and by 
attracting wildlife that may cause significant damage to crops. Trees in buffers may 
shade the field and reduce crop yield, while filter strips may become reservoirs of 
weeds and insect pests. Finally, riparian buffers and filter strips alter the configuration 
of the field making machinery maneuvering more difficult (Lynch and Tjaden, 2004).  
 
This section has shown evidence about the mechanisms linking production and 
conservation decisions. The analysis indicates that adoption of conservation practices 
may expand or reduce cropping operations depending on whether or not the use of the 
practice provides private incentives for cropping. The next step is evaluating the 
effect of cost sharing payments on conservation decisions. This evaluation is critical 
to determine the green-box quality of cost sharing programs. Since it has been proved 
that adoption of certain practices can expand cropping, then a positive effect of cost 
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sharing on adoption of these practices would be an indication that cost sharing 
payments may affect production levels and, consequently, they might influence trade. 
The analysis of these issues is carried out in the next sections. 
 
3.3 Effect of cost-sharing payments on adoption of conservation practices and 
permanent vegetative cover 
Differences in the expected shares of land served by different practices as result of 
cost-share funding are presented in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6. Estimated effects of cost-share payments on adoption of conservation 
practices 
 
Change in the share of land served Practice Farm size Estimate As. z-value 
Small -0.0748 -44.7919 
Medium 0.0239 7.2978 
Large 0.0264 5.5538 
Filter strip - Riparian 
buffer 
Sample average -0.0599 -35.0453 
Small 0.1925 9.3245 
Medium 0.2327 14.9955 
Large 0.2546 8.7606 Reduced Tillage 
Sample average 0.1993 10.4792 
Small 0.0012 0.4445 
Medium 0.0407 15.8530 
Large 0.0649 7.4245 
Grass- or Rock-lined 
Waterways 
Sample average 0.0080 3.0424 
Small -0.2227 -18.6897 
Medium -0.0332 -4.4332 
Large -0.0294 -0.2399 
Vegetative cover 
Sample average -0.1940 -16.4602 
 
The empirical results confirm hypotheses proposed by Malik and Shoemaker (1993) 
and by Lichtenberg (2004), namely, cost sharing (1) increases the use of land quality 
augmenting conservation practices and (2) promotes cropping on lower quality land, 
resulting in reduced vegetative cover. These results also admit the following 
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interpretation: cost sharing  has a positive effect on the scope at which practices 
presenting private incentives for expanding cropping operations are used; however, 
participant farms use permanent vegetative cover, pastures, and hayland (i.e. practices 
that, besides private goods, have positive off-farm spillovers8), less intensively than 
non-participant farms do. 
 
The evidence for filter strips and riparian buffers is mixed. Participating farms that 
are small in size implement these practices on a smaller share of land than farms that 
receive no funding, while medium and large participating farms implement more than 
non-participants. Following the discussion from the previous section, negative 
impacts of the implementation of a buffer on cropping should be greater when the 
area planted is a significant proportion of the total land operated (if only because of 
the higher opportunity cost of land). Therefore, negative effects on cropping should 
be more distinct on small than on large farms, which is in accordance with results in 
Table 3.6. This confirms that the opportunity costs of land are greater on small farms, 
a fact that should be taken into account when determining size and allocation of cost-
sharing awards.  
 
According to Table 3.3, a participant farm is a farm that has received funding for 
preservation of permanent vegetative cover or the implementation of at least one of 
the three practices in Table 3.1. Results in Table 3.6 suggest that, regardless of the 
                                                          
8Scenery and wildlife habitat, for instance. Additionally, pasture and permanent vegetative cover are 
biodiversity reservoirs, sequester carbon from the atmosphere (Lewandrowsky, 2004) and filter 
pollutans before they reach surface or underground water 
 
 83
bundle of practices that farmers have agreed to implement at the moment to apply, 
they will implement those practices that provide on-farm private benefits 
preferentially. From the previous analysis, we know that the use of reduced tillage 
and grass- or rock-lined waterways provides on-farm benefits and expand cropping at 
the extensive margin. If these are the kind of practices being implemented more 
frequently when cost share is provided, then the resulting expansion in cropping 
necessarily implies a reduction in the share of land under grassland, filter trips, 
riparian buffers, or other permanent vegetative covers. Thus, practices that supply off-
farm benefits may not be implemented or, if existing on the farm, they could be 
“displaced” by practices that provide on-farm benefits. Some previous evidence of 
this perverse effect of cost sharing is provided by Cattaneo (2003), who reports that 
one or more practices were not implemented in 17% of early EQIP contracts. She 
suggests that limited enforcing capabilities incentive farmers to include in their 
applications a selection of BMP that maximize the probability to be awarded; yet, 
after cost sharing is provided, they implement only those practices in the contract that 
are profitable. Additional light about this issue is shed by Vukina et al. (2003), who 
use data from CRP auctions to study farmers’ attitudes towards the environment. By 
analyzing the way farmers construct their bids, the authors conclude that “farmers 
value those environmental benefits which directly affect the productivity of their land 
but do not value those benefits which resemble public goods”. Among the services 
they found as poorly valued by farmers are improvement of air quality and wildlife 
habitat, while they were unable to conclude about water quality improvements. This 
suggests that farmers do not consider themselves as providers of off-farm benefits. 
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3.4 Extensive and intensive margin effects of cost-sharing payments on cropping  
The preceding sections have shown that (1) conservation technology can expand 
cropping and (2) cost sharing payments affect positively the adoption of conservation 
technology in general and the adoption of land-quality enhancing practices in 
particular. Here, I discuss the overall effects of cost sharing on acreage cropped. 
 
Table 3.7. Estimated effects of cost-share payments on the share of acreage 
cropped 
 
Change in the proportion of acreage cropped 2y∆  Farm size 
Estimate As. z-value 
Small 0.0352 1.7746 
Medium -0.0099 -0.5086 
Large 0.2125 5.4862 
Sample average 0.0361 1.9192 
 
According to equation (3.8), cost-sharing extensive-margin effect equals the negative 
of the change in vegetative cover. Thus, from Table 3.6, cost sharing has a positive 
extensive-margin effect on cropping. The effect on the land share cropped is 
particularly strong on small farms (an expansion of 22 percentage points), while it is 
smaller (less than 4 percentage points) on medium and large farms. Comparison 
between these results and the net effect of cost sharing on the share of land cropped 
(Table 3.7) sheds some light about the intensive margin effects of cost sharing 
payments. From Table 3.7 and contrasting with the 22 percentage-point expansion 
inferred from the reduction in vegetative cover, the net effect of payments on 
cropping in small farms is only 3.5 percentage points. According to equation (3.9), a 
necessary implication from these figures is that the land share being double cropped 
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has been reduced in about 18.5 percentage points in participant small farms. This is 
additional evidence that expansion in scope is more profitable than cropping 
intensification on small farms, and the former will substitute for the latter when 
technologically feasible. The net effect of payments on cropping is negligible on 
medium farms, which suggests that the 3.3-points expansion in scope is canceled by 
an almost equivalent reduction in double-cropped land. Finally, large farms that 
participate in cost sharing programs crop a land share 21.2 points larger that non-
participant farms. Since the same farms show an expansion on marginal land no 
greater than 3 percentage points, I conclude that the share of land being double 
cropped on participant farms is about 18 percentage points larger than on farms 
receiving no cost-share funding. These results suggest that positive intensive margin 
effects of cost sharing conservation technology increase with farm size. A plausible 
explanation for this outcome is that more intensive cropping operations require more 
capital and greater management time and skill. Thus, the impact of using conservation 
land-quality augmenting technology to intensify cropping is greater on larger farms 
because medium and large farmers are (on average) less capital constrained and have 
more time and managerial skill than small farmers 
 
4. Final remarks 
In this study I analyzed interactions between farmers’ conservation and production 
decisions in a disaggregated multivariate framework. Several contributions to 
literature emerged from the analysis. First, I provided evidence that adoption of soil 
conservation practices, particularly land-quality augmenting ones, expands cropping 
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both at the extensive and the intensive margins. Second, I showed that farms awarded 
cost share funding implement land-productivity improving practices on a share of 
land greater than farms that do not receive cost sharing do. Third, I showed the 
existence of a perverse effect of cost sharing payments: as farmers choose to 
implement preferentially those practices providing private benefits, the expansion in 
cropping induced by cost-sharing this type of practices reduces the share of land 
covered by practices that provide public goods as byproducts.  
 
The analysis indicated that effects of cost sharing payments on cropping change with 
farm size. Positive extensive margin effects predominate on small farms, which 
replace grassland and other vegetative covers by cropland. Positive intensive margin 
effects are more likely on large farms, which show no significant extensive margin 
effects. 
 
Cropping expansion at both the extensive and intensive margins resulting from the 
adoption of land-quality augmenting practices may imply additional nutrient runoff 
and more pesticide usage. The environmental balance of cost sharing these practices 
seems to be even more negative as results of the substitution of grassland and wildlife 
habitat by cropland (particularly on small farms). This study’s findings question 
whether the current design of cost-sharing programs permits to achieve their 
environmental goals. A more stringent oversight seems to be crucial both during the 
formulation of cost-sharing programs and all along their implementation in order to 
minimize unintended effects. Additionally, cost-sharing payments for practices 
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providing off-farm benefits may need to be increased in order to make them 
comparable to the opportunity costs of allocating land to them. Program 
administrators should consider more severe restrictions to cropping expansion and 
reconsider whether the adoption of land-quality augmenting practices needs to be 
cost-shared. It is likely that making not eligible some of the most profitable practices 
will harm program participation, and significant increment in the cost-sharing rates 
may be necessary to sustain or increase enrollment. Nonetheless, paying this price 
may be a need in order to achieve programs’ stated goals. 
 
The results obtained in this study raise questions about the “green-box” quality of 
payments that cost share adoption of land-quality enhancing practices on large farms. 
Results indicate that these payments have induced a significant increase in the share 
of land cropped (double cropping included) on large Maryland farms. Although 
similar effects showed no statistical significance on medium and small farms, they 
could become significant under the provisions of the new 2002 Farm Bill, which 
expands the budget of cost sharing programs dramatically.  
 
Maryland, on the other hand, is a small state that contains a small proportion of US 
cropland and produces only a small share of US agricultural output. Therefore, 
similar studies using data from larger agricultural states are needed to validate the 
findings of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Incorporating Soil Nutrient Dynamics into the Evaluation of Soil 
Remediation Programs? Evidence from Chile 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Most of the literature dealing with the economics of soil degradation focuses on the 
problem of soil depth reduction. Soil depth is modeled as a capital stock whose 
dynamics are determined by farmers’ actions and the natural regeneration rate of the 
soil (McConnell, 1983). Few studies analyze other aspects of soil degradation, such 
as the reduction of fertility, which may happen even when soil depth reduction is 
negligible. Additionally, plant nutrients are often included in economic analyses as a 
strictly variable input in the production function without consideration of nutrient 
pools. This approach is probably correct when soil nutrient dynamics have only 
marginal effects on plant nutrition or the prices of fertilizers are low relative to output 
prices, but these cases do not cover all the possible situations. At least two cases can 
be mentioned where the inclusion of the dynamics of the soil nutrient pools in the 
analysis is justified. The first one corresponds to the presence of significant carry-
over effects (Kennedy, 1986; Schnitkey et al., 1996). The second case happens when 
soils act like sinks by fixing a significant proportion of the fertilizer applied by the 
farmer and thus preventing plants from using it. 
 
This chapter discusses both theoretically and empirically some policy implications 
when soil nutrient dynamics are mistakenly ignored in the second case mentioned 
above. Specifically, the phosphorus fixation problem is used to illustrate how a 
program that subsidizes fertility replenishment can become inefficient if farmer 
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characteristics and dynamics of the soil nutrient reservoirs are not considered when 
defining the targeting strategy. 
 
Phosphorus (P) is not a limitation for crop production in most of the developed world. 
For instance, Sharpley et al. (1999) indicate that many states in the US show P-levels 
in their soils over the agronomic threshold9 implying that little or no additional P 
fertilization is required for commercial production of most crops. On the contrary, P-
deficit has become a major problem in developing countries as result of either natural 
low levels of phosphorus or depletion of once well stocked soil reserves (Buresh et 
al., 1997). Phosphorus fertility depletion occurs when no phosphate fertilization is 
provided to compensate for the phosphorus exported with products harvested in the 
farm (including beef or milk from permanently grazed pastures). The main reasons 
for soil fertility depletion are lack of financial resources to afford an adequate 
fertilization program or ineffectual or absent land property rights. In other cases the 
soil itself contributes to the problem. Depending on parent materials and weathering 
factors, the capacity of the soil to fix phosphorus can dramatically increase the cost of 
fertilization. Phosphorus fixation occurs when phosphate molecules react with soil 
particles leading to the formation of insoluble complexes. Only a small group of 
plants (see for example Gilbert et al., 1999; Hisinger and Gilkes, 1996) is capable of 
breaking apart some of those complexes and releasing P back to soil solution. For 
most crops, however, phosphorus becomes unavailable for plant uptake once it is tied 
up in these complexes. The capacity to fix phosphorus varies widely among soils. In 
                                                          
9 Agronomic threshold is the amount of a plant nutrient in the soil at which this nutrient is no longer a 
limitation to achieve the potential yield of the crop.  
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many sandy soils fixation is minimal, while the fixation capacity of soils derived from 
volcanic ashes (Andisols) and rich in allophanic clays can present a serious challenge 
for farming (Vander Zaag and Kagenzi, 1986; Espinosa, 1992). The P-fixation ability 
of allophanic soils are normally strong enough to reduce carryover effects to 
negligible levels and crops are able to utilize no more than 10 to 30% of the 
phosphorus applied as fertilizer (Ludwick, 2002). 
 
There are not many studies that analyze the economic impact of phosphorus depletion 
(some of the few cases include Abelson and Rowe, 1987; Buresh et al., 1997), and 
none, to the best of author knowledge, examine the impact of programs that subsidize 
soil fertility replenishment. Thus, a main contribution of this work is to fill this gap in 
the literature. In this chapter, I use data from Chile to analyze the implications of 
including soil phosphorus dynamics when selecting the targeting strategy for a soil 
remediation program. 
 
The chapter is organized in the following way. Section Two presents a brief 
description of the dynamics of soil phosphorus. Section Three discusses the existence 
of a steady state in the farmer’s problem of determining the optimal rate of 
fertilization. The discussion includes the solution of a continuous optimal control 
problem where the level of soil phosphorus is treated as a stock variable. The fourth 
section presents data from a fertility replenishment program from Chile and the 
econometric framework used to evaluate the theoretical model presented in Section 
Three. Then I use a Monte Carlo EM algorithm to solve an endogenous switching 
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regression model with unobserved switching points, which permits evaluating the 
impact of the cost sharing program conditional on the alternative fertilization 
strategies the farmer can follow. Section Five discusses the results of the econometric 
estimation. Section Six concludes. 
 
2 Soil phosphorus stocks and supply of plant-available phosphorus 
Phosphorus is one of the three necessary macro elements for plant nutrition (the 
others are nitrogen and potassium). Plant roots are able to absorb this nutrient only 
from the soil solution and only in inorganic forms. When the fixation capacity of the 
soil is high, phosphate fertilizer applied is attached to soil particles almost 
immediately (Potash and Phosphate Institute, 2001). As indicated by Ludwick, 
(2002), the strongest attachment occurs with oxides of iron (Fe) primarily in soils 
with pH below 4.0. As soil pH increases, P is fixed preferentially in aluminum (Al) 
compounds. This binding is not that strong as with iron, but the availability of 
phosphorus to plants is still reduced dramatically. Finally, binding to relatively weak 
alkaline (Ca) compounds can occur in soils with pH higher than 7.5. In many soils, 
binding of P happens at the surface of soil particles, which permits the process be 
reverted by mass action processes. However, natural release of P back to solution 
happens at a lower rate than binding does (Barrow, 1983a and 1983b). On the other 
hand, in volcanic soils with allophanic clays and humus-Al complexes, the fixation 
process tends to be irreversible (Espinosa, 1992; Nanzyo et al., 1997). 
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Figure 4.1. Soil-phosphorus reservoirs and phosphorus dynamics. 
(Modified from Steward and Sharpley, 1987) Pi and Po indicate sources of inorganic 
or organic phosphorus, respectively. 
 
Traditionally, phosphorus in the soil is treated as occurring in three reservoirs or 
pools (see Figure 4.1): a buffer pool, a labile pool, and phosphorus in the soil solution 
or solution-P. All of them receive contributions from both organic and inorganic 
sources. The buffer pool includes inorganic phosphorus contained in soil minerals and 
strongly attached to Al and Fe compounds, and organic phosphorus occurring in 
stabilized organic matter. The labile pool includes inorganic phosphorus loosely 
attached to the surface of clay particles, and a limited amount of organic phosphorus 
that can be rapidly mineralized and thus made available for plant uptake. Solution-P, 
on the other hand, is non-attached inorganic phosphorus that can either be 
immediately taken up by plants, used by soil biota and converted in organic 
phosphorus, or, alternatively, attached and become part of either the labile pool or the 
buffer pool. Significant movement of phosphorus between the buffer and labile pools 
only happens in the long run, while the interaction between the labile pool and the 
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soil solution is much faster. Large contributions to solution-P can be provided 
through fertilization with a highly soluble source of inorganic phosphorus. 
 
In absence of fertilization and phosphorus exportation, there exists a chemical 
equilibrium between the three reservoirs mentioned above. If equilibrium is altered, 
e.g. when concentration of solution-P is reduced by plant uptake, the labile pool 
releases phosphorus to solution to restore the equilibrium between the labile-pool and 
the soil solution. This, in turn, reduces the phosphorus level in the labile pool, which 
alters the equilibrium between labile and buffer pools. In this case, however, given 
the low rate at which phosphorus can be released from the buffer pool, the speed at 
which the labile pool recovers is slower than the speed at which phosphorus is 
released to solution. Pastures used to raise cattle, for instance, feature a vegetative 
cover during most of the season. Periodic harvest or grazing of this cover 
permanently alters the equilibrium among phosphorus reservoirs. The labile pool is 
progressively depleted unless phosphate fertilization is provided. If phosphorus 
fertilizer is not applied, less and less phosphorus is available from soil solution, 
which, in turn, reduces forage and crop production. 
 
If farmers wait to fertilize until signals of depletion become apparent, chemical 
linkages among phosphorus pools often make it difficult to recover the initial fertility 
levels. Fertilization causes an abrupt increase in the concentrations of phosphorus in 
the solution, which triggers a change in the kinetics of soil phosphorus. Since the 
equilibrium among the pools must be restored, most of phosphorus provided by 
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fertilization will go to enrich the labile and buffer pools. The lower the level in the 
buffer pool the less phosphorus will remain available in solution to plant uptake. This 
is one of the reasons explaining why, once a certain level of depletion is achieved, 
soils with high phosphorus-fixation capacity are not remediated in developing 
countries. Unless cheap sources of phosphate are available, the gains from 
fertilization do not compensate (at least in the short run) the cost of the massive 
applications necessary for replenishment.  
 
2.1 State equation of the phosphorus pools. 
Modeling of phosphorus dynamics in this chapter is simplified by assuming the 
existence of only two reservoirs in the soil: the buffer pool and the plant-available 
pool. The buffer pool is responsible for both P-fixation and long run release of 
phosphorus to plant-available pool. The plant-available pool includes phosphorus 
loosely attached in the labile pool and phosphorus free in the soil solution. 
Considering two stocks instead of three is not a restrictive assumption. Given the fast 
kinetics of phosphorus between solution and the labile pool, it seems reasonable 
considering them as a single reservoir for purposes of policy analysis.  
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Figure 4.2. Phosphorus fixation function. 
 
Let x  be the non-negative level of phosphorus in the buffer pool. I assume that soil 
fixation power follows a function ( )xα , which depends only on the level of the buffer 
pool and represents the proportion of phosphorus fertilizer that is fixed during the 
season (and, consequently, contributes to the level of phosphorus in the buffer pool 
x ). The properties of ( )xα  are: ( )0 1xα< ≤ , ' ( ) 0xα ≤ , ' (0) 0α = , and '' ( )xα  is 
negative for x x<   and positive for x x>   (see Figure 4.2). The phosphorus binding 
power of the soil attains its maximum at 0x = , i.e. when all possible binding sites in 
the buffer pool are unoccupied, and approaches zero as x becomes large. The state 
equation giving the seasonal change in the buffer pool is 
 
( ) ( )x x z xα γ κ= − +      (4.1) 
 
x x  
( )xα1 
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According to equation (4.1), the level of the buffer pool increases by capturing 
phosphorus from fertilization z  in amount of ( )x zα  and via natural weathering of 
parent materials and organic matter at constant rate κ . On the other hand, it is 
reduced by phosphorus desorption according to a function ( )xγ , which is quasi-
convex in x  and satisfies ( )' 0xγ >  for 0x > , ( )' 0 0γ =  and ( )0 0γ = . Desorpted 
phosphorus goes to the plant-available pool in order to sustain the chemical 
equilibrium between the two pools. 
 
Accordingly, there are two sources of phosphorus for the plant-available pool: a 
proportion ( )1 xα−  of the fertilizer applications z , and contributions from the buffer 
pool in amount ( )xγ .  
 
3. The optimal fertilization strategy.  
3.1 The farmer’s dilemma as an optimal control problem 
I represent the problem in a continuous-time infinite-horizon optimal-control 
framework with one control and one state variable. The control variable is the rate of 
fertilization z , while the state variable is the phosphorus level in the buffer pool. 
Thus, the farmer solves 
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( )( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
0
0(0)
max 1  
. .    
        0 ,    
rt
t
z x x w z e dt
s t x z x x
z x x
f α γ
α γ κ
∞
−⋅ − + − ⋅
= ⋅ − +
≥ =
∫

 (4.2) 
 
where ( )tz  is the phosphorous fertilization rate at time t , ( )tx  is the corresponding 
phosphorus level in the buffer pool, 0x  is the initial buffer pool level, w  is the 
phosphorous price, r  is the farmer’s discount rate, and ( )f ⋅  is a twice-differentiable 
production function. Prices have been normalized such that output price equals one.  
 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1H f z x wz z xα γ λ α γ κ= − + − + − +   (4.3) 
 
where λ  is the shadow value of a marginal increase in the level of the buffer pool. 
The first order necessary conditions for interior solutions of (4.3) are 
 
( )'0      1 0H f w
z
α λα∂ ≤ ⇒ − − + =∂             (4.4) 
( )( )' ' '          H r z f rx λ λ λ α γ λ λ∂ = − ⇒ = − − +∂      (4.5) 
                      H x x zα γ κλ
∂ = ⇒ = − +∂      (4.6) 
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The interpretation of (4.4) follows from the well-known rule of profit maximization: 
it will be optimal to fertilize until marginal benefits equalize marginal costs. In this 
case we have two kinds of benefits: on one side there are the revenues from output 
sale, and on the other side we have an enriched buffer pool, which ensures less 
phosphorus fixation and fertilization savings in future crop seasons.  
 
Non-convexities make it difficult to find a closed form for the internal solution(s), if 
any, of problem (4.2). Therefore, I combine graphical and numerical tools in the next 
section to analyze the existence and nature of potential equilibria. 
 
3.2 Phase-diagram analysis 
I begin with the phase diagram in the z x−  plane. Differential equations giving the 
rates of change of x  and z  are needed in order to characterize the shapes of the 
curves 0x =  and 0z = . The equation for x  is simply the state equation (4.6), while a 
differential equation involving the first derivative of z  with respect to time can be 
obtained by taking the time derivative of equation (4.4). We get 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' '' '1 1 ' 0z x z f f xα γ α α α λ λα − − + − − − + =      (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) can be combined with equations (4.4) through (4.6) to obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )}
' ' '' '
2 ''
'
' ' ''
2 ''
' '
1 1 '
1
1  1 '
1
                     1 ' '
z z x f f x
f
z z f f w z
f
r w f f w z
α γ α α λ λαα
αα γ α α γ κ α γ καα
α α γ
 = − − − − − + −
= − − − − + − − − +− 
+ − − + − −
 
 (4.8) 
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Equations involving 0x =  and 0λ =  needed to construct the phase diagram in the 
xλ −  plane are provided by the state equation (4.6) and the adjoint equation (4.5). 
 
I draw the phase diagrams following four steps: 1) choosing functional forms for 
( ) ( ) ( ),  ,  and  f α γ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2) solving numerically the equations 0x =  and 0z =  as 
functions of x  and z , and equations 0x =  and 0λ =  as functions of x  and λ , 3) 
drawing the curves 0x =  and 0z =  in the z x−  plane and curves 0x =  and 0λ =  in 
the xλ − , and 4) determining the signs of x , z , and λ  in each isosector of the phase 
diagrams. 
 
3.2.1. Functional forms and baseline parameter values. 
I assume the following functional forms for the functions involved. 
Production function: ( ) ( )1 Buf u A e−= − , where A  represents the maximum yield 
the farmer can achieve using the technology available and B  is a measure of the 
“speed” at which that potential is attained (see Figure 4.3a). In this case a larger B  
corresponds to a more efficient use of soil phosphorus. 
 
To choose the values of w , A  and B  for the baseline simulation, I use the work of 
Smith-Ramírez et al. (2002), which classifies Chilean dairy farms according to 
technical, productive and human capital characteristics. I chose to work with dairy 
farms because dairy and beef farms are the main target of fertility remediation 
programs in Chile. To simplify the notation I normalize the maximum yield to the 
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unity, i.e. 1A = , which transforms w  in the price of phosphorus relative to the 
maximum revenue for acre achievable by the farmer conditional on the technology 
available. 
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Figure 4.3. Production and fixation functions for different parameter values 
 
In what follow, I use information from Region X in Chile, which produces 70% of the 
Chilean milk and includes about 6,700 dairy farms. Smith-Ramírez et al. (2002) 
classify the farms in four groups according to their production levels and technologies 
used in their production process. Table 4.1 gives some characteristics of the groups. 
u  
1.2,  5A B= =
1,  5A B= =
1,  2A B= =
( )f u
x  
( )xα  
0.02,  6, 0.1a b c= = =  
0.02,  3, 0.1a b c= = =
0.02,  6, 0.6a b c= = =
0.2,  6, 0.1a b c= = =  
a) 
b) 
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Table 4.1 Production indicators of Region X dairy farms (Chile) 
 
Group Indicator Quartile 12 Median Quartile 3 
production per ha1 (Kg ha-1 year-1) 459 701 959 
farm size (ha) 6 10 15 S1 
production per cow (Kg year-1) 741 1131 1547 
production per ha (Kg ha-1 year-1) 1345 1906 2588 
farm size (ha) 65 91 154 S2 
production per cow (Kg year-1) 1868 2647 3594 
production per ha (Kg ha-1 year-1) 2575 3542 4685 
farm size (ha) 50 83 144 S3 
production per cow (Kg year-1) 2220 3053 4038 
production per ha (Kg ha-1 year-1) 3768 4408 5134 
farm size (ha) 120 197 274 S4 
production per cow (Kg year-1) 3925 4592 5348 
1 1 hectare (ha) is equivalent to 2.471 acres.  
2 25% of the population have a value below quartile 1; 25% of the population have a value above 
quartile 3. 
 
The Chilean dairy pays different prices to farmers according annual production. 
Currently, farmers in the S1 group receive an average of 13.6 cents per kilogram of 
fluid milk, those in the S2 group receive 15.3 cents, those in the S3 group receive 
17.0 cents, and those in the S4 group receive an average of 18.7 cents per kilogram. 
The price of the ton of phosphorus (in its form of P2O5) is 645 dollars in Chile. In 
order to obtain values of w  for each group in Table 4.1, I need to know the potential 
yield per hectare for each of them. Since these data are not available, I used the 95th 
percentile for the production per hectare for each group. After combining all this 
information, the values for w  are 2.39, 1.30, 0.79, and 0.57 for groups S1, S2, S3, 
and S4, respectively. The selection of a value for parameter B  is discussed below in 
conjunction with the selection of the parameters for the phosphorus fixation function. 
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Phosphorus fixation function: ( ) ( )11 b x cx aeα −= + , where parameters ,  ,  and  a b c  
determine together the location of the inflection point of the curve in Figure 4.3b. The 
most influential parameter in this function is c , which controls the curvature of the 
function before it reaches the inflection point. According to Escudey et al. (2001), 
fertile Chilean Ultisols and Andisols (both volcanic ash soils) contain from 733 mg P 
kg −1 to 3470 mg P kg −1. For purposes of the simulation, I take the middle value, 
2200 mg P kg −1 as a measure of the aggregated capacity of the buffer and plant-
available pools. The plant-available pool, however, contains only a small fraction of 
the phosphorus in the soil, which means that 2200 mg P kg −1 is also a good measure 
of the buffer pool only. To reproduce the high fixation power of Region X Andisols, I 
choose parameters ,  ,  and  a b c  such that the soil fixes 90% of the fertilizer applied 
when the buffer pool is at half of its capacity. Soil fixation power declines then 
rapidly to fix only 20% of the fertilizer when the buffer pool is at two thirds of its 
capacity. Both conditions, along with the requirement that ( )xα  goes to zero as x  
approaches 2200, are satisfied if 0.018,  6a b= =  and 0.1c =  (see Figure 4.3b).  
 
To choose parameter B  in the production function, I use two pieces of information: 
(1) the average dairy farm in Region X produces no more than a third of his potential 
yield (Smith-Ramírez, 1999) and (2) the phosphorus content of the plant-available 
pool never exceeds 5% of the phosphorus content of the buffer pool (Rowell, 1994). 
Therefore, I choose B  such as the yield is one third of the potential when the level of 
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the plant-available pool is 0.1 mg P kg −1, which corresponds to 5B =  (see Figure 
4.3a, u  is the level of the plant-available pool). 
 
Desorption function: ( )x sxγ = . A linear form is assumed, where the parameter s  
denotes the proportion of the buffer pool being released to the plant-available pool 
during the crop season and ranges from zero to one. There is little useful information 
to guide the selection of a value for s  to use in the simulation. However, since the 
plant available pool rarely contains more than 5% of the phosphorus in the buffer 
pool, I chose s  equals to 0.05. For the contribution from parental material to the 
buffer pool (the parameter κ  in the state equation), I chose a value 0κ =  to better 
represent volcanic soil conditions. 
 
3.2.2 Determination of the curves 0x = , 0z =  and 0λ =  
The 0x =  and 0z =  curves were drawn in the x z−  plane  by writing the right-hand 
sides of expressions (4.6) and (4.8) as functions of z  and x . Both expressions were 
then set equal to zero and solved as simultaneous equations by numerical methods10 
for various combinations of parameter values. The 0x =  and 0λ =  curves were 
drawn in an analogous manner using equations (4.5) and (4.6). 
 
According to the previous discussion, the parameter values used for the baseline 
simulation were 0,  0.15,  1.8,  1,  5,  0.018,  6,  0.1 and 0.05r w A B a b c sκ = = = = = = = = = . 
                                                          
10 I used Mathematica 4.1 from Wolfram research Inc. 
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A value 1.8w =  was chosen in order to represent farmers in the groups S1 and S2 
(see Table 4.1), which accounts for about the 80% of the farmers in Region X and 
have similar characteristics as three quarters of Chilean dairy farmers (Smith-Ramírez 
et al. 2002). Common values for the farmer’s discount rate in the literature for natural 
resource economics range between 10% to 20% (Kremen et al. 2000; Lu and 
Stocking 2000). Here, I have chosen 0.15r = . Graphical outcomes are presented in 
Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4. a) Curves 0x =  and 0z =  in plane x z− , b) curves 0x =  and 0λ =  in 
plane x λ− . 
 
A noteworthy characteristic of the solutions depicted in Figure 4.4 is the existence of 
two candidates for interior solutions, which originate in double branched curves for 
the loci 0z =  and 0λ = . The two solutions ( )* * *, ,x z λ  for the parameter values used 
in the simulation are ( )0.467,  0.027,  1.383  and ( )0.947,  0.185,  1.261 . The only 
0λ =  
0z =  
0x =  
0x =
λ
x
z  
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observable amounts in these two sets of values are the fertilization rates: 0.027 and 
0.185 tons of phosphorus (in its P2O5) form) per hectare. They correspond to 60 and 
400 kilograms of Triple Superphosphate (the most used phosphate fertilizer in Chile). 
Fertilization rates of 60 Kg of Triple Superphosphate are typical in subsistence 
farming in Chile and characterize most of the farmers in the S1 group. Fertilizer 
application rates between 300 and 400 Kg of Triple Superphosphate are usual among 
the most productive farms in groups S3 and S4. 
 
The existence of two branches in the loci 0z =  and 0λ = , however, is conditional on 
the values of function parameters, phosphorus price, and discount rate. Figure 4.5 
sketches the phase diagram for different combinations of values on the x z−  plane. In 
order to give some structure to the next discussion, I label the branches of 0z =  as 
the “low-yield branch” (the left-hand side branch) and “high-yield branch” (the right-
hand side branch). The labels follow the crop yields at each solution. For instance, for 
the parameter values used to construct Figure 4.4, the yield (recall that maximum 
potential yield equals one) at the low-yield (LY) solution is 0.127, while it is 0.603 at 
the high-yield (HY) solution. This outcome reproduces closely Chilean conditions: 
farmers in groups S1 and S3 produce milk on grassland, however, farmers in S3 
quintuplicate the production per hectare of those farmers in group S1 (see Table 4.1). 
 
According to Figure 4.5a, under low fixation power and/or high production potential, 
only one internal solution exists: the high-yield equilibrium. Thus, under high 
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production levels and high milk prices (groups S3 and S4), soil remediation is always 
optimal and every farmer attains the steady state.  
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Figure 4.5. Phase diagrams on plane x z−  for different parameter values 
 
Figures 4.4b and 4.4c, on the other hand, show two alternative fertilization paths with 
two corresponding interior solution. Conditions for the existence of low-yield and 
high-yield solutions include: medium to high phosphorus prices relative to revenue 
Groups S3 and S4 
Group S2
Group S1 
w > 2.5 
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per hectare (groups S1 and S2 in Table 4.1), medium to high phosphorus fixation 
power, and/or limited technology for achieving high crop yields. I discuss this case 
extensively below since it characterizes the conditions facing most Chilean dairy 
farmers. 
 
Finally, Figure 4.5d presents the case in which low milk prices and/or poor 
technological levels prevent the existence of an interior solution. This is the case in 
which, after the resource is exhausted, farm operations are abandoned or the farm is 
sold. This case represents to many small farmers that in the 1990s migrated to cities 
and sold their farms either to bigger farmers or to people who currently use the land 
for forestry11. 
 
3.2.3 Analysis of the phase diagram and optimal paths 
Since we are interested in determining optimal fertilization strategies, I analyze here 
the case depicted in Figure 4.4b on the x z−  plane. As mentioned previously, cases 
depicted in figures 4.3b and 4.3c are the ones that better represent the conditions of 
Chilean farms. The full diagram is presented in Figure 4.5. 
 
First, I determine the nature of the internal solutions. I follow the procedure in 
Léonard and Van long (page 96, 1992), which includes taking a first order 
approximation of the system composed by the differential equations12 for x  and z  
                                                          
11 Chilean government supports actively the planting of fast-growing trees on eroded soil or on soil 
whose fertility has been mined. 
12 Alternatively, we can use a different pair of equations such as those for x  and λ  or those for z  
and λ . 
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(i.e. equations (4.6) and (4.8)) in the neighborhood of each solution and finding the 
characteristic roots (eigenvalues) of the linearized system. The nature of the solutions 
is determined then according to the magnitudes and signs of the roots and whether 
they are real or complex.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Phase diagram on plane x z−  
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For the baseline simulation parameters, the roots at the LY node are 0.075 1.168i+  
and 0.075 1.168i− , i.e. one is the complex conjugate of the other. Since the real part of 
the roots is positive, the LY node is an unstable focus spiraling away from the node. 
The analysis of the eigenvalues, however, characterizes only the behavior of the 
system in the closest neighborhood of the LY node. Therefore, the existence of a limit 
cycle around the LY solution cannot be ruled out (Clark, 1990 pages 185-192). If a 
limit cycle exists, both the LY fertilization rate and the LY buffer stock level oscillate 
around the node ( )* *1 1,x z . Regarding to the HY node, its roots are 0.476 and -0.326. 
Since they are real, distinct, and have different signs, the HY solution is a saddle 
point.  
 
In summary, two fertilization regimes can be postulated: a cyclic regime represented 
by the LY solution ( )* *1 1,x z  and the HY stable regime at ( )* *2 2,x z . Intuitively, these 
two solutions arise from the behavior of the production and fixation power functions, 
( )f  and ( )α  respectively. In the LY regime, although the marginal productivity 
of phosphorus is high, a larger share of phosphorus applied goes into the buffer stock 
so it is optimal to limit phosphorus application. In the HY regime, the opposite 
occurs. How high *1x  can be depends on the relative behaviors of the functions ( )f  
and ( )α . In soils with high fixation power (high value of c ), since the marginal 
productivity of phosphorus decreases faster than the marginal reduction in fixation 
power does, *1x  cannot correspond to a significant enrichment of the buffer pool. 
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Therefore, the solution ( )* *1 1,x z  represents a regime associated with low crop yields, a 
“subsistence” fertilization path.  
 
The existence of an oscillatory “equilibrium” for the system has its counterpart on the 
field. A common practice among farmers in groups S1 and S2 is to carry out 
periodical “low-scale” fertility remediations. The cycle begins with the planting of 
grass on a degraded pasture, which includes the application of “high” rates of 
phosphorus (most commonly 200-250 Kg of Triple Superphosphate per hectare). 
Unable to sustain this level of fertilization for more than one season, the farmer will 
apply only a reduced fraction (some farmers apply nothing) of the initial rate during 
the next seasons. Thus, the initial “remediation” corresponds to investing in 
improving the content of phosphorus in the buffer pool. During the next seasons, the 
farmer gets his investment back by harvesting from the enhanced soil and reducing 
the phosphorus applications. After a certain number of seasons (three years usually), 
the soil is back to its original condition and it is time to repeat the process. 
 
The relevant issue from a policy standpoint at this stage of the analysis is the 
identification of the determinants that make a farmer to choose one regime over the 
other. The phase diagram in Figure 4.6 provides several clues pointing toward which 
those determinants are. Note that no optimal fertilization path combining rates below 
*
2z  can reach the HY steady state. Shifting from the LY to the HY regime involves a 
large short run increase in phosphorus applications since attaining the HY steady state 
is feasible only by applying *2z z> . But that short run increase in the fertilization rate 
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may not be affordable for farmers who face a high effective price of phosphorus or 
interest rate because of credit constraints or who utilize less efficient technology. In 
the field, this is the case of many small Chilean farmers, who lack of adequate 
technological and managerial skills (low values for parameters A  and B ). Many of 
them have little schooling; many are also old and have short planning horizons (hence 
high discount rates).  
 
Farms with highly depleted soils in region I can reach the HY equilibrium following 
an optimal trajectory such as iii). It begins with fertilization rates well above *2z  and 
then gradually reduces phosphorus applications as it approaches the HY equilibrium. 
Farmers already in the LY steady state can move to the HY equilibrium by applying 
fertilization rates greater than *2z . The higher are these fertilization rates the faster is 
the approaching to the equilibrium. Trajectory iii), for instance, is faster than 
trajectory iv) at early stages of the fertility remediation, while v) is faster than iii). A 
more aggressive approach is depicted by trajectory vi), which considers the use of 
very high fertilization rates to move from the LY regime to *2x . Only once the 
equilibrium buffer pool level is attained, phosphorus applications can be reduced until 
reaching the HY solution ( )* *2 2,x z  
 
From the analysis, there are two issues relevant for policy analysis. First, we have the 
existence of two alternative long-term regimes, or, in other words, two optimal long-
term fertilization strategies. Second, the endogenous nature of the regimes raises 
questions as to the appropriateness of using exogenous indicators as the core 
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components of the targeting policy of a soil fertility remediation program. As the 
preceding analysis has shown, the optimal levels of remediation of the buffer pool 
depend on individual characteristics such as soil properties, discount rate, efficiency 
in the production process, and technology used in the farm. 
 
According to the analysis of the phase diagram, it seems that the capacity to afford 
high fertilization rates is crucial in determining the fertilization path a farmer will 
follow. In order to find worthwhile to remediate the soil, the present value of the HY 
steady state must exceed the present value of the cost of attaining it. For farmers with 
very low initial buffer pools, i.e. ( ) *10x x< , this may not be the case, particularly if 
they face managerial or financial constraints. These farmers may not have a choice 
except to follow a LY fertilization strategy. On the other hand, we have farmers that 
are neither technologically nor financially constrained and thus they will consider 
achieving the HY steady state ( )* *2 2,x z  as the optimal option. 
 
In order to allocate a limited budget efficiently, a program aiming soil fertility 
remediation should provide financial support preferentially to those farms considering 
the LY solution optimal if left to their own, and support should be provided only up 
to the point at which soil fertility makes the HY equilibrium affordable. It can be 
argued that providing funding beyond that point will bring benefits from accelerating 
the transition to the HY steady state. However, unless enough money is available to 
accomplish the two tasks, program budget will bring more benefits if aimed to move 
farmers from a LY regime to a path ending at the HY steady state. Making it 
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affordable for farmers who would otherwise choose the LY regime to attain the HY 
equilibrium brings short and long run benefits, while accelerating the transition brings 
short run gains only. 
 
Adequate targeting is expected to be difficult in one-time subsidies for remediation, 
like the one to be discussed in the next sections, which do not consider follow-up 
subsidies for fertility maintenance. If such a program fails in collecting adequate 
information from farmers, then it is possible that part of the budget goes to people 
that, after cost sharing is stopped, find optimal to move back to the LY regime. 
Consider, for instance, old farmers with short time-horizons or farmers with 
technological constraints that make unaffordable to sustain a fertilization rate *2z . 
Graphically, this outcome corresponds to a trajectory that begins at some point on the 
vertical line representing *2x , moves through region III in Figure 4.6, and returns to 
the cyclical path around ( )* *1 1,x z . 
 
The second important issue is the endogenous nature of the steady state levels 
( )* *1 1,x z  and ( )* *2 2,x z . According to the simulations in Figure 4.5, the steady state 
level of the buffer pool depends on soil properties ( ,  ,  and κ γ α ), phosphorus price, 
and farmer’s attributes (such as age, farming experience, and financial condition). 
Thus, steady state levels are not exogenously determined but rather depend on 
individual characteristics, a fact that has implications for targeting cost-sharing. 
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Fertility remediation programs like the one to be discussed in the next section 
currently use an exogenous target level to allocate the program budget. Thus, only 
farms having a phosphorus level below the target are eligible to receive funding. 
These programs provide remediation cost sharing (or, in other words, a subsidized 
phosphorus price) to enrolled farmers until the target level of phosphorus in the soil is 
achieved. This could take more than one crop season, but, once the target level is 
reached, cost sharing is stopped. 
 
The consequences of using an exogenously determined target level to allocate the 
budget on program efficiency depend on where the target level is located with respect 
to the alternative equilibria in Figure 4.6. Consider for instance that the exogenous 
target level tx  is greater than 
*
2x  for a particular farmer. In this case, the farmer is 
eligible for receiving cost sharing; however, if the buffer pool level was already at *2x , 
then cost sharing will have only short run effects. After tx  is attained and cost sharing 
ceased, the farmer will return to the HY equilibrium and cost sharing effects will 
vanish. On the other hand, if the farmer condition was on some cyclical path around 
( )* *1 1,x z , then, after attaining the target, the farmer will follow some optimal 
trajectory back to ( )* *2 2,x z . In this case, cost sharing has the desired effect, although 
some cost sharing money may be spent inefficiently when taking the phosphorus level 
beyond *2x .  
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Consider now a farmer for who the target level is in between the two equilibriums, 
i.e. * *1 2tx x x< < . In this case, if the farmer is already at the HY equilibrium, then he is 
not eligible. If the farmer is at the LY equilibrium or on the way to the HY 
equilibrium but still below tx , he is eligible for cost sharing. Awarded farmers will 
move from region I to region II until reaching tx x= , then cost sharing will be 
stopped. What happen afterwards will depend on farmer attributes. Some farmers 
may follow a stable path, such as trajectories iii) and iv), and reach the HY steady 
state. Others may move from region II to region III and finally finish again in LY 
regime. In the first case, cost sharing has the desired effect of altering the long run 
fertility regime. In the second case, there are short term effects only. The effect of 
cost sharing on farmers on the way to the HY equilibrium will be to accelerate the 
transition, but the effect will be short run as well. Thus, if * *1 2tx x x< < , cost sharing 
will have long run effects only on farmers who would otherwise have been at the LY 
regime and stay at the HY equilibrium once attained it. 
 
Evaluating the performance of a fertility remediation program under the theoretical 
framework developed above requires dealing with two econometric issues. First, it is 
necessary to handle the problem of determining which long-term fertilization strategy 
the farmer would choose in the absence of cost sharing. Note that even we may 
assume the farmer has attained some equilibrium, we, in general, do not know in 
which of the two possible regimes he is. Second, both short and long run effects of 
the program must be estimated in order to identify clearly the two fertilization 
regimes predicted by the theoretical model. Actually, if farmers that are not 
 116
financially constrained receive cost sharing, then long run effects should be negligible 
for them. I discuss these two issues in the following sections, where I describe the 
program from which data was collected and develop the econometric model. 
 
3.3 A description of the Chilean soil-fertility replenishing program. 
Beginning in 1996 after successive measures to open the local economy to foreign 
markets, the Chilean government implemented a cost-sharing program aiming to 
replenish soil fertility in those agricultural operations whose existence could be 
jeopardized in a free-trade environment. The program provides support to farms with 
phosphorus pools depleted either naturally or by human activities, which are 
widespread in the country due to the volcanic origin of most of its soils and the fact 
that managerial and financial constraints prevent many farmers from replenishing 
phosphorus stocks. So far, farms awarded by the program have been mainly beef and 
dairy operations on grassland in central and southern Chile 
 
Participation in the program is voluntary and farmers must submit an application to 
be considered for funding. Applications can be prepared by an authorized agronomist, 
who can be a private consultant or on the staff in a public agency. Applications are 
ranked according to a number of factors, the principal one being whether the soil 
phosphorus level falls below a target level previously established by the program. 
Applicants who are awarded funding receive enough to ensure that the target level is 
attained, a process that might take more than one season.  
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The current phosphorus target level has been kept constant in the last years at 15 mg 
Kg-1 Olsen in the plant-available pool. This level is motivated by agronomic 
considerations: 15 mg Kg-1 Olsen in the plant-available pool is about the minimal 
level necessary to guarantee survival of most grass species and hence commercial 
production on most type of grasslands in Chile. The premise of the program is that, 
once the target is achieved, farmers will maintain a phosphorus level of at least 15 mg 
Kg-1 Olsen without additional funding.  
 
The Chilean program gives us a good opportunity to test the theoretical model 
presented in Section 3. At least three testable hypotheses emerge from the preceding 
analysis. First, there exist two farmer sub-populations. One is constrained financially 
and/or technologically and thus unable to achieve the HY equilibrium level of soil 
phosphorus. The other sub-population faces no significant constraints. Thus, the level 
of phosphorous observed in the second group in absence of the program is the HY 
steady state level (or the farm is on the way to that equilibrium level). 
 
Second, the short run effect of cost sharing on the LY subpopulation exceeds the 
short run effect on the HY subpopulation. Although program administrators want to 
grant cost-share funding to the constrained group preferentially and to those farms on 
the way to the HY equilibrium alternatively, they cannot avoid awarding farmers 
already at the HY steady state because they do not know neither which sub-
population farmers belong to nor the individual HY phosphorous levels. Nonetheless, 
from the discussion in Section 3.2.3, the short run effect of cost sharing should be 
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greater on farms in the LY regime because those farms are the ones receiving the 
largest phosphorus applications. 
 
Finally, there is a third hypothesis: cost sharing has no long run impact on the HY 
subpopulation but does on the LY subpopulation. However, panel data, which is not 
available in this study, are needed to test this hypothesis.  
 
The following sections present an econometric framework that models the existence 
of two phosphorus fertilization paths in a farmer population, where the adoption of 
one or the other depends on whether the farmer faces or not constraints that prevent 
him from attaining the HY equilibrium. Simultaneously, the impact of a cost-sharing 
program is evaluated conditional on the fertilization strategy adopted by the farmer. 
By using an endogenous-switching regression with unobserved switching points, I 
analyze the suitability of using an exogenous target level as the core of the targeting 
policy in a cost-sharing program aiming the recovery of a natural-resource stock.  
 
4 Data, Econometric model and Estimation 
4.1 Data.  
The Chilean Agricultural Policy and Statistics Office provided the data used to 
evaluate the theoretical model. Data were collected in 2001 by surveying a total of 
856 farms from the population targeted by the cost-sharing program. The survey 
sample was stratified according to geographic location (4 north-to-south strata) and 
total acreage (2 strata). The sample was distributed proportionally within each 
stratum; the Agricultural Policy and Statistics Office provided the corresponding 
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expansion factors. After cleaning the data set from observations with contradictory or 
missing information, the sample contained observations on 505 farms, 177 of which 
received cost sharing for at least one year and 328 of which were never awarded cost 
share funding. A short description of the variables used in this study follows. 
Descriptive statistics of the full set of variables is presented in Table 4.2. 
 
The variable SHARE indicates the share of land enrolled in the program at some 
point between years 1996 and 2000 inclusively and is censored from below at zero. 
The variable POLSEN gives the current (year 2001) level of phosphorus in the plant 
available phosphorus. Twelve soil samples were used to build a composite sample for 
each farm, which was analyzed to obtain an estimate of the average level of soil 
phosphorus content. Phosphorus fixation power is proxied by the variable ALSAT, 
which gives the aluminum saturation of the soil or level of aluminum in the soil 
solution. In Chilean soils, most of the phosphorus is fixed to aluminum compounds. 
Thus, following the discussion from the introduction, the higher the aluminum 
concentration in a soil, the higher is its phosphorus fixation power (i.e. the higher the 
parameter c  in ( )xα ). 
 
Variables related to credit accessibility and cash flow included in the econometric 
estimation are AACRE, and REV. AACRE gives farm acreage suitable for 
agricultural operations, and REV provides an estimation of average annual revenue 
per hectare. It is expected that farms with more utilizable acreage have more access to 
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the credit market, while farms with higher average revenue face lower financial 
constraints.  
 
An operation-type dummy, CATTLE, was included to control for cost sharing 
targeting preferences. Program regulations prohibit awarding cropping operations 
unless crops are being used at the initial stage of a rotation previous to establish 
pasture land. The variable CATTLE takes the value one if the farm held more than 
one animal unit of dairy or beef cattle.  
 
Two sets of geographic dummies were included as explanatory variables. Excluding 
the Metropolitan Area (which includes the capital city, Santiago), Chile is divided 
administratively in twelve regions that are numbered in ascending order from north to 
south. The phosphorus cost sharing program has concentrated on Regions Seven 
through Ten. It is well known among Chilean agronomists that soil parent materials 
change north to south from alluvial and granite materials to volcanic ash. Most of the 
volcanic soils are located in Regions Nine and Ten. To control for soil properties 
other than aluminum saturation, a set of four location dummies for Regions Seven, 
Eight, Nine, and Ten were included in the empirical models. It is expected that 
probability of being awarded cost-sharing is higher for southern regions since 
volcanic soils show a particularly strong phosphorus fixation power. Consequently, 
the current level of phosphorus is expected to decrease north to south (other things 
equal). 
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A second set of three location dummies (ANDES, VALLEY and COAST was 
included. The purpose of these three dummies was to characterize soil limitations to 
agricultural activities. In Chile the more productive soils are located in the valley 
between the coastal range next to the Pacific and the Andes Mountains. Soils in the 
piedmont of the Andes are young volcanic soils with poor chemical properties that 
limit crop and grass production. Soils on the coastal range, on the other hand, are 
highly erodible and sensitive to droughts during the dry season (summer in Chile). 
Thus, it is expected a higher level of cost-share awarding among farmers close to the 
Andes or located on the coastal range, because they are likely to be more financially 
constrained than farmers on the Valley and thus a preferred target for program 
administrators. Finally, a higher level of phosphorus is expected on farms on the 
Valley given the less restrictive qualities of their soil. 
 
Table 4.2. Dependent and Explanatory variables 
Variable Description Mean St. dev. 
SHARE 
Binary variable indicating whether or not the farm 
has received cost sharing between 1996 and 2000 
inclusively. 
0.3626 0.4812 
POLSEN Logarithm of the phosphorus level (measured by the Olsen method) in the plant-available pool. 2.0123 0.7915 
AACRE Acreage usable for agricultural production (103 ha) 0.0321 0.0528 
REV  Average annual revenue per hectare (106 Ch$ ha-1) 0.0223 0.0345 
AlSat Percentage of Al saturation in the soil solution 0.8456 0.8180 
CATTLE Farm holds more than 1 animal unit of beef or dairy cattle (yes=1) 0.8474 0.3600 
SEVEN Farm is located in Region Seven (yes=1) 0.0746 0.2630 
EIGHT Farm is located in Region Eight (yes=1) 0.1215 0.3271 
NINE Farm is located in Region Nine (yes=1) 0.1899 0.3926 
TEN Farm is located in Region Ten (yes=1) 0.6140 0.4873 
ANDES Farm is located on the hills at the feet of Andes range (yes=1) 0.4097 0.4923 
VALLEY Farm is located in the valley between the Coast and Andes ranges (yes=1) 0.3160 0.4654 
COAST Farm is located on the Coastal range or in the hills at the eastern side of that range (yes=1) 0.2743 0.4466 
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The available data include farms that have received funding during one or more years 
between 1996 and 2000 inclusively. A positive short-run effect of the program is 
expected on every farm because the program monitors the application of the fertilizer. 
Hence, the 2001 survey data used in this study is likely to detect some positive effect 
even on those farms facing no constraint to achieve the HY equilibrium. These data 
are cross-sectional and thus do not permit investigation of the long run effects. The 
theoretical model does, however, indicate that the effect of cost-sharing on fertilizer 
use during the transition period on farms in the LY regime should exceed that on 
farms in the HY regime, permitting a test of this hypothesis. 
 
In what follows I develop a framework that allows testing the existence of two farm 
subpopulations with different fertilization strategies as indicated by the theoretical 
analysis. Simultaneously, I determine whether or not the effect of the program is 
conditional on the subpopulation a farmer belongs to. This framework also allows for 
an examination of how well cost sharing funds have been targeted. If two separate 
groups of farmers do exist and those groups can be distinguished by observable 
characteristics, then those characteristics can and should be used to determine how 
cost share funds are allocated. If those groups cannot be distinguished by observable 
characteristics, then the current allocation strategy of the program may be adequate 
and an exogenous target level may be a reasonable criterion for determining funding 
awards.  
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4.2 The econometric model. 
Let *2iy  denote the amount of cost-share money allocated to farm i  and 
*
3iy  be the 
phosphorus content in the corresponding plant-available pool. A model that allows 
evaluating the impact of cost sharing on soil phosphorus level is the following  
 
*
2 2 2 2
*
3 2 3 3 3
i i i
i i i i
y X
y y X
β ε
α β ε
= +
= + +   (4.9) 
 
where the jiX  ( )2,3j =  are vectors of exogenous explanatory variables, and jβ  are 
parameter vectors to estimate. Cost sharing funding is not an event that is exogenous 
to farmer decisions since farmers self-select by deciding whether to apply for 
funding. Consequently, the equations in (4.9) cannot be estimated independently and 
the correlation between equation disturbances must be allowed to adjust freely during 
the estimation.  
 
The theoretical model suggests that farmers’ fertilization strategies, hence their 
responses to receiving cost sharing, depend on farm characteristics. To introduce the 
process of selecting a fertilization strategy (in simpler words: whether to be in the LY 
regime or in the HY regime), I include the following equation to the equation system 
(4.9) 
 
*
1 1 1 1i i iy X β ε= +   (4.10) 
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The unobserved variable *1iy  gives “farmer’s propensity to attain the HY 
equilibrium”. Thus, *1iy  is negative or positive depending on whether farmer i  faces 
constraints that reduce his chances to attain the HY equilibrium. Farmers facing no 
constraint should be closer to the HY phosphorus level so that the receipt of cost 
share funds should have only a small short-run effect on the level of their phosphorus 
stocks. By contrast, cost share funds should allow constrained farmers ( *1 0iy ≤ ) to 
switch from an LY to a HY regime and should thus have a larger long-run effect on 
the plant-available buffer phosphorus stocks. 
 
The econometric model is now 
 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2
* *
3 3 2 3 3 3 1
* *
3 4 2 4 4 4 1
         0
        0
i i i
i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
y X
y X
y y X y
y y X y
β ε
β ε
α β ε
α β ε
= +
= +
= + + <
= + + ≥
  (4.11) 
 
Model (4.11) is a switching regression model with endogenous switching and 
fertilization strategy conditional on cost-share funding. Since farmer “propensities”, 
*
1iy , are unobserved, the model has unobserved switching points. 
 
Note that if fertilization decisions are not conditional on farmer constraints, the 
switching should generate no differential effects on the parameters of the remaining 
equations. In other words: if a single equilibrium exists, then elements in the 
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parameter vectors 3 β  and 4β  should be equal to each other. However, if alternative 
regimes do exist, then these parameters should be different. I use a Wald test to check 
equality between the two sets of estimated parameters. 
 
4.3 Implementing a MCEM for a switching regression with unobserved 
switching points 
If distribution assumptions are made for the disturbances then the parameters in the 
equation system (4.11) can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Before proceeding 
to the estimation method it is necessary to establish the relation between the 
dependent variables and its observed counterparts. Two out of the three dependent 
variables are latent. As discussed previously, the variable *1iy  is fully unobserved and 
*
2iy  is binary. The variable 3iy , on the other hand, is observed fully. Thus 
 
*
1iy  is unobserved fully  
*
2
2 *
2
1     if    0
0   if   0
i
i
i
y
y
y
 >=  ≤
 *3 3i iy y=   
 
The model in (4.11) is a system of structural equations combining latent and observed 
variables and, in consequence, the MCEM algorithm introduced in Chapter 2 can be 
used for its estimation. For estimation purposes the observed counterpart 2iy  is 
estimated by the dichotomous variable SHARE and 3iy  by the logarithm of the 
continuous variable POLSEN. 
 
 126
Let proceed now with the implementation of the MCEM algorithm for this problem. 
First, let assume that the disturbance terms in (4.11) are distributed according to 
 
( )
1
2
3
4
~ 0,
i
i
i
i
N
ε
ε
ε
ε
    Σ   
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12 23 24
13 23 33 34
14 24 34 44
1
1
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
   Σ =    
  (4.12) 
 
where 33σ  and 44σ  have been set equal to one according to the usual normalization 
required for identification. Then the complete information likelihood function can be 
written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* *1 1
' 1 ' 1
1 21 2 1 23 2 3 2
, 0 , 01 1 2 2
1 1 1 1, , | exp exp
2 22 2i i
c
i i i i
i y i y
L π π
− −
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∏ ∏α β y ε ε ε ε  
 
where ( )1 2 3 4, ,β β β , β=β , ( )3 4,α α=α , 
12 13
1 12 23
13 23 33
1
1
σ σ
σ σ
σ σ σ
  Σ =    
, and 
12 14
2 12 24
14 24 44
1
1
σ σ
σ σ
σ σ σ
  Σ =    
. 
 
Since 1Γ  and 2Γ  are identity matrices, the complete information log-likelihood 
function reduces to 
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   (4.13) 
 
where N  is the total number of observations. Note that the parameter 34σ  in (4.12) 
cannot be estimated since there are no observations in both regimes simultaneously. 
Also note that the last two terms between brackets in (4.13) cannot be written in 
practice because, as *1 iy  is not observed, we do not know the regime in which each 
observation must be included. This is standard in switching models with unobserved 
switching points (Dickens and Lang, 1985). In the classical maximum likelihood 
approach the log-likelihood function for each individual is the weighted sum of the 
likelihoods of being in each regime, where the weights are the conditional 
probabilities of being in the respective regimes. In (4.13) we still have a sum of two 
terms; however, instead of weighting the sum, the idea is to simulate *1 iy  as if the 
individual were in one regime in order to calculate the first sum and then simulate *1iy  
as if the individual were in the other regime in order to calculate the second sum. 
Details are given below when describing the implementation of the Gibbs sampler. 
 
The Expectation step is straightforward from (4.13) and it requires the calculation of  
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Analogously 
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where 
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and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
* *
1 1,...,3| , , , , 0       
ji
m m m m
ji iy
jE y yµ − = = Σ ≤ α β y  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
* *
1 1,..., 3| , , , , 0       
ji
m m m m
ji iy
jE y yµ + = = Σ > α β y  
 
Recall that ( ) ( ) ( )* | , , ,m m mjiE y Σ α β y  equals jiy  if jiy  is observed and must be 
estimated by Gibbs sampling otherwise. 
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I replace the M-step by two conditional M-steps. Given the simplicity of expressions 
(4.14) and (4.15), it is useful to define the vector ( )1 2 3 3 4 4, , , ,β β α β ,α β=θ . Thus, the 
first conditional M-step maximizes  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
* * * *
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1ln 2 ln ln tr | , , tr | , ,
2 2 2 2 2
i i i i
m m m m
i i
y y y y
N Q Qπ − −
≤ > ≤ >
   − − Σ − − Σ − Σ Σ − Σ Σ         ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑y yθ θ θ θ
 
 
with respect to θ  conditional on the elements of ( )1mΣ  and ( )2mΣ  to produce  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* * * *
1 1 1 1
1
1 ' ' ' '
1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
i i
i i i i
m m m m m m m
i i i i i iy y
y y y y
X X X X X Xµ µ
−
+
≤ > ≤ >
   = Σ + Σ Σ + Σ         ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   θ    (4.16) 
 
where the matrices in (4.16) are define as 
1
2 *
1
3
1
2 *
1
4
0 0 0
0 0 0
   if   0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
   if   0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
X
X
y
X
X
X
X
y
X
    ≤   =     >   
 , ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
*
1
*
2
*
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
3
*
1
*
3
  if   0
0
  if   0
0
i
i
i
i
i
m
y
m
y i
i
m
y m
y
m
y
i
i
y
y
y
y
µ
µ
µ µ
µ
    ≤     =     >     
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1, 1, 1,
11 12 13
1, 1 1,
12 22 23
1 1, 1, 1,
13 23 33
0
0
0
0 0 0 0
m m m
m m
m
m m m
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
   Σ =     
  
  
  
 , ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2, 2, 2,
11 12 14
2, 2 2,
12 22 24
2
2, 2, 2,
14 24 34
0
0
0 0 0 0
0
m m m
m m
m
m m m
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
   Σ =     
  
  
  
 
 
and ( )1,mijσ  and ( )2,mijσ  are the elements in the i-th row and j-th column of ( ) 11m −Σ  and 
( ) 1
2
m −Σ  respectively. The second conditional M-step then maximizes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
* * * *
1 1 1 1
1 11 1
1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1ln 2 ln ln tr | , , tr | , ,
2 2 2 2 2
i i i i
m m m m m m
i i
y y y y
N Q Qπ + +− −
≤ > ≤ >
   − − Σ − − Σ − Σ Σ − Σ Σ         ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑y yθ θ θ θ
 
with respect to the elements in Σ  to obtain an estimate for ( )1m+Σ . 
 
There remains the implementation of the Gibbs sampler necessary to estimate the 
matrices iQ  in the objective function. Its construction is straightforward from Section 
4.2 of Chapter 2 with obvious substitutions in the formulas for the conditional means 
| ( )ji i jµ −  and variances 2|j jσ − . To simulate the unobserved “observations” of the 
dependent variables proceed as follows. 
 
The variable *1iy  is fully unobserved. As we do not know what regime 
*
1iy  belongs to, 
we have to consider the possibility that *1iy  may belong to either. Consequently, in 
order to estimate ( )2 miσ −  and ( )*
1i
m
y
µ −  in (4.14) we must sample from a normal 
distribution with mean ( )1 | ( 1)
m
i iµ −  and variance ( )21| 1mσ −  truncated from above at zero. 
Analogously, the simulation must be performed from a normal distribution with mean 
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( )
1 | ( 1)
m
i iµ −  and variance ( )21| 1mσ −  truncated from below at zero when estimating ( )2 miσ +  and 
( )
*
1i
m
y
µ +  in (4.15).  
 
The variable *2iy  is binary. Accordingly, we simulate 
*
2iy  from a normal distribution 
with mean ( )2 | ( 2)mi iµ −  and variance ( )22| 2mσ −  truncated below at zero if *2iy  equals one and 
truncated above at zero if *2iy  equals zero. 
 
The Gibbs sampler was started with 300 simulations and increased by 15 simulations 
at every iteration of the MCEM algorithm. The number of dismissed simulations, 
burnk , was kept constant at 150. The routine converged after 420 iterations. A 
simulation of size 3400R =  and 400burnr =  was used for the estimation of the 
information matrix and asymptotic standard errors. Results are presented in Table 4.3 
(location dummies COAST and SEVEN were excluded from the estimation as 
required for identification). Estimation outcomes are presented in Table 4.3 
 
Table 4.3. Estimates of the switching regression model 
 
Equation Variable Estimate As. st. error As. t-stat. P-value 
Constant -0.0197 0.0395 -0.4986 0.6183 
AACRE 0.7208 0.3809 1.8922 0.0594 
ALSAT -0.2014 0.0992 -2.0293 0.0430 
REV 0.9573 0.2036 4.7012 0.0000 
VALLEY 0.2639 0.2618 1.0081 0.3139 
Switching 
ANDES 0.1249 11.6548 0.0107 0.9915 
Constant -0.1395 0.2367 -0.5893 0.5559 
REV -0.9582 0.8294 -1.1553 0.2485 
ALSAT 0.8262 0.3517 2.3495 0.0192 
CATTLE -0.0463 0.0359 -1.2875 0.1986 
VALLEY -0.9630 0.4981 -1.9332 0.0542 
Cost share 
ANDES 0.8390 1.5384 0.5454 0.5858 
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Constant 0.7499 0.3258 2.3018 0.0218 
SHARE 0.1082 0.0061 17.8456 0.0000 
REV 1.4109 0.1926 7.3238 0.0000 
EIGHT -0.2377 0.0601 -3.9531 0.0001 
NINE -0.3188 0.1427 -2.2343 0.0259 
TEN -0.7226 0.0472 -15.3075 0.0000 
VALLEY 0.5283 0.1188 4.4462 0.0000 
Phosphorus pool 
level 
HY regime 
ANDES -0.2634 0.0626 -4.2078 0.0000 
Constant 1.8991 0.3977 4.7752 0.0000 
SHARE 0.8270 0.0546 15.1443 0.0000 
REV 0.3741 0.2935 1.2749 0.2030 
EIGHT -0.1993 0.0402 -4.9600 0.0000 
NINE -0.5512 0.2098 -2.6270 0.0089 
TEN -0.9331 0.1937 -4.8177 0.0000 
VALLEY 0.1430 0.1937 0.7384 0.4606 
Phosphorus pool 
level 
LY regime 
ANDES 0.5217 0.6220 0.8387 0.4021 
12σ  -0.0116 0.0125 -0.9255 0.3552 
13σ  0.2633 0.0553 4.7629 0.0000 
23σ  -0.4355 0.0486 -8.9554 0.0000 
33σ  1.0256 0.0260 39.4721 0.0000 
14σ  0.6556 0.0721 9.0881 0.0000 
24σ  -0.2472 0.0149 -16.5854 0.0000 
 
44σ  1.1550 0.0985 11.7285 0.0000 
 
 
5. Results  
Overall, the signs of the coefficients in Table 4.3 correspond closely to what was 
expected from the theoretical model. In what follows I identify regime *1 0iy ≤  as the 
“low yield” regime and regime *1 0iy >  as the “high yield” regime. 
 
5.1. Existence of two subpopulations and two fertilization regimes.  
To confirm whether there are or not two fertilization regimes, I use a Wald test to 
compare the beta coefficients of the two Phosphorus-pool-level equations in Table 
4.3. The test provides a value 307.6W =  (7 df), which permits rejecting the 
hypothesis of equality between the two sets of coefficients. The test result confirms 
that there exist two farm sub-populations following different fertilization regimes. 
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Results from the switching equation suggest that the larger the share of land usable 
for agricultural purposes and the higher the revenue per hectare, the higher is the 
likelihood that a farm belongs to the high yield regime. The evidence is particularly 
strong for the revenue variable, which confirms the importance of financial condition 
on fertilization strategy. From the same equation, we have that the more intense is the 
power of the soil to fix phosphorus (measured by variable ALSAT), the higher the 
probability of being in the low yield regime. This outcome was expected since a 
higher level of free aluminum in the soil is a signal of greater depletion and thus of a 
more costly soil remediation. 
 
The coefficients of the regional dummies in the phosphorus equations are negative 
and increasing in magnitude north to south. This indicates that phosphorus level 
decreases as we move to south, which was expected since the presence of volcanic 
ashes in soil parental materials increases north to south in Chile. Soils in the central 
valley show more phosphorus in the plant-available pool than those close to the 
Andes or on the Coastal range, which is an indication of the greater productivity of 
valley soils. This is evidence of farmers’ economic rationality: they fertilize more on 
soils having greater production potential. However, this is true only if farmers are not 
financially or technologically constrained. From the results for the equation of the 
low yield regime, we can see that constrained farmers show no significant differences 
between the phosphorus levels in valley farms and those in farms located on the 
Andes piedmont or on the Coastal range.  
 
 134
5.2. Determinants of cost share allocation.  
The only statistically significant coefficient in the cost share equation is the 
coefficient of the ALSAT variable. Since the key funding requirement of the program 
is being below the target level in the plant-available pool, a positive and significant 
coefficient of our indicator of phosphorus fixation power was expected. None of the 
remaining variables in the equation is significantly different from zero, indicating that 
agronomic considerations alone were used to determine cost share awards, with 
economic considerations playing no role. This result confirms the stated policy of the 
cost sharing program. Results from the switching equation suggest that financial 
condition is an important determinant of fertilization strategy, so that it is feasible to 
improve targeting using observable characteristics, e.g. using farm revenue to 
determine awards. 
 
5.3. Effects of cost sharing on fertilization.  
The final evidence supporting the theoretical model comes from the comparison of 
program effects between the two regimes, i.e. 
 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ] [ ]( )
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
4 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
3 1 1 1 2 2 2
| 0, 1 | 0, 0 | 0, 1 | 0, 0
                    | , | ,
                          | ,
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
E y y y E y y y E y y y E y y y
E X X E X X
E X X
α α ε ε β ε β ε ε β ε β
ε ε β ε β
≤ = − ≤ = − > = − > =
= − + ≤ − > − − ≤ − ≤ − −
> − > − [ ]3 1 1 1 2 2 2| ,i i i i iE X Xε ε β ε β+ > − ≤ − (4.17)
 
 
where the last expectations can be written as function of the standard normal pdf and 
the conditional bivariate normal cdf. After calculating (4.17) for every individual in 
the sample and taking the average, we obtain an estimate of 0.415 with an asimptotic 
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standard error calculated using the delta method of 0.133. This estimate is positive 
and different from zero at a 1% significance level. This result supports the hypothesis 
that cost sharing has a greater effect on the phosphorus level of constrained farmer 
who would be in the LY regime in the absence of cost sharing. 
 
 
Overall, these results support the idea that the threshold separating the two sub-
populations is actually determined endogenously and that the use of an exogenously 
determined target phosphorus level should not be used as the sole cost share 
allocation criterion.  
 
Program administrators should care more about determinants of farmer behavior at 
the moment to allocate the program budget. By identifying the characteristics that 
makes a farmer more likely to be in one regime or in the other it would be possible to 
increase program efficiency by a more careful targeting. The way targeting should be 
improved, however, is not an easy problem. Determining the actual financial situation 
of applicants requires collecting sensitive information, which would make the process 
more complicated and require extra paperwork. As a result we may find that the 
additional transaction costs of application may discourage participation on the part of 
farmers for whom cost sharing would do the most good, i.e. financially constrained 
farmers with low managerial and technical skills.  
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6. Final remarks. 
This chapter analyzed the targeting policy of a soil remediation program aiming to 
replenish phosphorus fertility of Chilean soils. By using an optimal-control approach 
it was shown that, depending on soil and farmer characteristics, a farmer may choose 
between two long-run phosphorus fertilization paths: 1) apply low rates of 
fertilization and sustain a low yield level of phosphorus in the soil, or 2) apply high 
fertilization rates initially and then attain and maintain a high yield level of 
phosphorus in the soil pools. 
 
The existence of two possible equilibria, which are endogenously determined, 
questions the suitability of using an exogenous target level as the primary determinant 
in the allocation policy of a fertility remediation program. Thus, if the target is set too 
high with respect to the individual HY phosphorus level, at least part of cost sharing 
money becomes a net transfer. On the other hand, if the target is set too low, cost 
sharing may cause only short run effects and the farmer will move back to the LY 
equilibrium level in the long run. 
 
An empirical cross-sectional evaluation of the model confirmed that two fertilization 
regimes do exist. As predicted by the theory, financial conditions are important 
determinants of the fertilization path followed by the farmer and they must be 
considered in the targeting policy of the program 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
1 Introduction 
The study carried out in the previous chapters has two components. The first one is 
methodological (Chapter 2) and it formulates a computational approach to estimate 
models involving unobserved information. The second component (chapters 3 and 4) 
evaluated two conservation cost-sharing programs. Chapter 3 presented an empirical 
study that uses the estimation method implemented in Chapter 2 to analyze 
multivariate responses to programs that cost share adoption of conservation practices 
in Maryland. Chapter 4 analyzes both theoretically and empirically the targeting 
policy of a soil remediation program that provides cost share for recovering 
phosphorus fertility in Chilean soils. In what follows, I summarize the main 
conclusions of this work and discuss some areas of potential research. 
 
2. A Monte Carlo EM algorithm for estimating equation systems with linear 
latent structures.  
The methodological contribution of this work is a Monte Carlo EM (MCEM) 
algorithm suitable for efficient estimation of systems of equations having a linear-in-
parameter latent structure. Although algorithms like this have been formulated before 
for models containing specific types of latent variables, this study has extended the 
method to handle potentially any type of missing information and to include the 
estimation of structural models. The combination of Gibbs sampling in the E-step and 
sequential maximization in the M-step permits circumventing high-dimensional 
integration and makes the algorithm more robust to problems of “fragile” 
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identification and starting values. Furthermore, the combination of Gibbs sampling 
and Louis method allows an easy estimation of the information matrix without the 
problems associated to the use of finite-difference Hessians.  
 
The MCEM algorithm formulated here revealed very robust when analyzing 
multivariate responses on cross-sectional data. An obvious extension of the method 
would be its formulation for panel data including probit and tobit panel models. In 
these cases, individual heterogeneity can be treated as one more latent variable and 
thus be simulated via Gibbs sampling. A more advanced extension of the method 
would be its application to dynamic panel models with latent response variables. 
Dynamic panel models with latent structures are hard to estimate because not always 
all the elements in the string ( )1 2 1 1, ,..., , , ,...i i it it it iTy y y y y y− +  are observed. For 
instance, if the variable ity  is censored from below, it is frequent that some of the 
string elements are missing because ity  fall below the censoring threshold for some 
values of t . Current available methods eliminate observations having some of the ity  
unobserved in order to make the estimation feasible. This waste of information would 
not happen under a MCEM approach since the string can be “repaired” by simulation.  
 
3 Effect of cost sharing on conservation effort and cropping expansion.  
Chapter 3 analyzed the interactions between conservation and cropping decisions in a 
disaggregated multivariate framework. Several contributions to literature emerged 
from the analysis. First, it was shown that adoption of soil conservation practices, 
particularly land-quality augmenting ones, expands cropping both at the intensive and 
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extensive margins. Second, it was provided evidence showing that farms awarded 
cost share funding implement land-productivity improving practices on a greater 
share of land than farms that do not receive cost sharing. Third, it was shown the 
existence of a perverse effect of cost sharing payments: since farmers choose to 
implement preferentially those practices providing private benefits, the expansion in 
cropping induced by cost-sharing this type of practices reduces the share of land 
covered by practices that provide public goods.  
 
Cropping expansion at both the extensive and the intensive margins resulting from 
adoption of land-quality augmenting practices may imply more agrichemical usage. 
Additionally, if these practices are implemented on sensitive land, the generation of 
additional nutrient and soil runoff is possible. Thus, the environmental balance of cost 
sharing these type of conservation practices seems no clear, especially if we consider 
the effects on scenery, wildlife, and water quality that substituting grassland and 
wildlife habitat for cropland may have (particularly on small farms). Cost-sharing 
payments for practices providing off-farm benefits may need to be increased in order 
to make them comparable to the opportunity costs of allocating land to them. 
Simultaneously, program administrators should consider more severe restrictions to 
cropping expansion and reconsider whether the adoption of land-quality augmenting 
practices needs to be cost-shared. 
 
Since Chapter 3 is the first study that analyzes cost sharing programs from a 
multivariate point of view, its scope can be extended in a number of ways in order to 
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get a better picture of the effects of working-land conservation payments. Fist of all, 
similar analyses can be carried out for sets of practices targeting types of non-point 
source pollution other than soil runoff. Examples include conservation practices used 
in nutrient, pest, and animal waste management. More elaborated extensions of this 
work involve studying short and long run effects of cost sharing payments. Dynamic 
analysis would allow estimating the effect of cost sharing on the persistence in the use 
of conservation practices, and how faster is the rate of adoption of conservation 
practices among program participants when compared with farmers receiving no 
funding. Other issues possible to investigate using dynamic panel models is 
determining which practices need cost-sharing as “seed money” and which need a 
more sustained support in order to guarantee its adoption. Finally, some practices may 
act as starters of the adoption process, i.e. their adoption may trigger the subsequent 
adoption of related practices. Cost sharing programs may benefit greatly if “seed” 
practices are identified because those practices could be awarded preferentially in 
order to start an adoption sequence. Multivariate dynamic analyses could be useful in 
detecting such practices (although the econometrics does not look easy in 
perspective). 
 
4 The rationality of using and exogenous target level in soil fertility remediation 
programs.  
In Chapter 4 I discussed the convenience of using an exogenous target level as the 
central component of the targeting policy of a soil remediation program. I showed 
theoretically that, conditional on whether a farm is technologically or financially 
constrained, farmers may follow either a low-yield phosphorus fertilization path or a 
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high-yield fertilization path. Additionally, I gave theoretical evidence that provision 
of funding conditional only on being below an exogenously determined target level is 
inefficient since individual high-yield optimum may be lower than the target, in 
which case cost sharing becomes a transfer. Alternatively, if the target level is below 
the high-yield optimum, then cost sharing could fail in providing enough funds to 
move the farmer on a stable path towards the high yield equilibrium. Predictions from 
the theoretical model were validated using cross-sectional data from a program that 
cost-share the recovery of phosphorus fertility in Chilean soils. The econometric 
estimation confirmed the existence of two fertilization paths, where following one or 
the other depended on farm’s financial condition. Although a greater positive effect 
of the program was detected on financially constrained farms, data limitations do not 
allow analyzing the persistence of these effects. Panel data and dynamic analyses are 
needed to disentangle short and long run effects of the program and determine on 
which group of farmers (if any) program effects persist in the long run.  
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